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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of the research is to understand the concept of cooperative conversions and 
compare the performance of converted cooperatives to those that never converted using financial 
accounting analysis and organisational dynamism. Even though the differences were relatively 
small, companies had the strongest relative financial performance than cooperatives. Companies 
had the strongest performances in asset and revenue growth. Average revenue growth for 
companies from 2004 to 2007 was 29% as compared to 15% by cooperatives and asset growth was 
25% for companies compared to 12.5% by cooperatives. Results further indicate that for the past 
two years, cooperatives seem to be reporting decreasing performance in most of the financial ratios 
analysed. Thus, based on results from the financial analysis, operating as a company or converting 
from a cooperative to a company could result in slight increases in financial performance. 
 
Rapid change presents various challenges and opportunities for businesses in today‘s dynamic 
environment. As a result, business dynamism is becoming an increasingly important aspect and 
factor in determining success. Based on a dynamism score card, the study shows that companies are 
by far much more dynamic than cooperatives, with a score of 83.75 compared to 62.33 out of 100 
respectively. However, cooperatives compare relatively well to companies in as far as 
organisational strategy, management, organisational structure and culture. Their limitations come 
from their property rights framework which is by far less dynamic than that of companies owing to 
the limitations and constraints of the Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005). The main shortcomings of 
cooperative property rights were that of not allowing external investors into the cooperative and the 
one member one vote principle for primary cooperatives or the 15% cap for secondary cooperatives.  
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OPSOMMING 
Die vernaamste doelwit van hierdie navorsing was om die konsep van koöperatiewe omsettings te 
verstaan en die prestasie van omsette koöperasies te vergelyk met dié wat nog nooit deur middel 
van finansiële rekeningkundige analise en organisatoriese dinamisme omgesit is nie. Hoewel die 
verskille relatief klein was, het maatskappye die sterkste relatiewe finansiële prestasie gehad in 
vergelyking met koöperasies. Maatskappye het ook die sterkste prestasie in bate- en inkomstegroei 
getoon. Gemiddelde inkomstegroei vir maatskappye vanaf 2004 tot 2007 was 29%, in vergelyking 
met 15% vir koöperasies, terwyl bategroei vir maatskappye 25% was in vergelyking met 12.5% vir 
koöperasies. Die resultate toon verder dat koöperasies oor die afgelope twee jaar verminderde 
prestasie blyk te rapporteer in die meerderheid van die finansiële verhoudings wat geanaliseer is. 
Dus, op grond van die resultate van die finansiële analise, sal funksionering as ‘n maatskappy of 
omsetting van ‘n koöperasie na ‘n maatskappy kan lei tot ‘n effense verhoging in finansiële 
prestasie. 
 
Snelle verandering bied verskeie uitdagings en geleenthede vir maatskappye in die huidige 
dinamiese omgewing. Gevolglik is sakedinamisme besig om ‘n toenemend belangrike aspek en 
faktor in die bepaling van sukses te word. Op die basis van ‘n dinamisme-telkaart het hierdie studie 
getoon dat maatskappye baie meer dinamies is as koöperasies, met ‗n telling van 83.75 in 
vergelyking met 62.33 uit 100 onderskeidelik. Koöperasies vergelyk egter relatief goed met 
maatskappye in soverre dit organisatoriese strategie, bestuur, organisatoriese struktuur en kultuur 
behels. Hulle beperkings kom van hulle eiendomsregraamwerk, wat baie minder dinamies is as dié 
van maatskappye op grond van die beperkings van die Wet op Koöperasies (Wet 14 van 2005). Die 
vernaamste tekorte van koöperatiewe eiendomsregte is dat hulle nie eksterne beleggers in die 
koöperasie toelaat nie en die beginsel van een lid, een stem vir primêre koöperasies of die 15% perk 
op sekondêre koöperasies.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
According to the Registrar General of Cooperatives in South Africa, about 90% of commercial 
cooperatives have converted to companies since 1993. Changing from a cooperative which by its 
nature is user (service) oriented, to a company which is investor (profit) oriented comes with 
significant changes to the (i) objectives, structure or purpose of the organisation, (ii) management 
and governance issues mainly ownership, control, management, organisational culture and styles 
(iii) performance measurement and expectations for example, shares (value, how they are managed 
and shareholding), profits (value and how they are distributed). Because of the significance of these 
changes, the decision to convert from a cooperative to a company needs to be well informed. The 
key question that serves as the main objective of the study is whether the conversion to the 
company business model enhances the performance of converted cooperatives relative to 
cooperatives that never converted. 
 
Chaddad and Cook (2004) have attributed such organisational changes to the inherent weaknesses 
of the traditional cooperative business model mainly its ill defined property rights which result in 
the free rider, horizon, portfolio, control and influence costs problem. Chaddad and Cook (2004) 
further argue that such weaknesses or ill defined property rights of cooperatives have led to the 
emergence of new cooperative models (where policies have allowed such actions) such as the 
Proportional Investment Co-operatives (PICs), Member-investor Co-operatives (MICs), New 
Generation Co-operatives (NGCs), Cooperatives with capital seeking entities and Investor-share 
Co-operatives (ISCs) or alternatively outright conversions to companies. The study will use the 
property rights approach as the theoretical framework to understand the motives that induce such 
organisational changes and whether companies are a superior business form than cooperatives. In 
addition, central issues that have to be addressed before or during a conversion are those of changes 
in ownership and control, which can appropriately be analysed under the property rights framework.  
 
Even though the research relies and acknowledges the relevance and importance of property rights 
in explaining organisational changes and performance, other factors apart from property rights that 
determine the success of business organisations in today‘s increasingly competitive and dynamic 
environment, mainly organisational dynamisms and culture, management styles, competence and 
incentives are investigated (Godo (2006); O‘Connor (2001); Ruben & Lerman (2004)). The study 
seeks to further investigate and compare how cooperatives and companies are different in terms of 
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these factors. In South Africa, the deregulation of markets and withdrawal of state support also 
resulted in fundamental changes to agribusinesses and the agriculture sector. Before 1996, most 
commercial cooperatives were heavily supported and even operated monopolies in certain 
industries. After, deregulation, cooperatives were forced to adapt or fail. Thus, in comparing 
dynamism, prudence will be observed as some of the changes were a result of cooperatives catching 
up to dynamic practices already implemented by companies.  
 
By studying the conversions from cooperatives to companies, and researching whether the 
performance of cooperatives is enhanced if they convert, the research seeks to determine whether 
cooperatives are a superior or inferior business model in this regard. The answer to this question 
would be important in concluding whether the cooperative form of business still has merits in 
modern day business or is obsolete? Thus whether such conversion trends have to be accelerated or 
retarded in today‘s modern business environment. Of interesting note is the passing of the 
Cooperatives Act 2005 (Act 14 of 2005), which the study will also discuss in light of whether it 
accelerates or retards such conversions. Criticisms, merits or the way forward on such policies can 
only be levelled if clear understanding of the process and consequences of conversions are 
highlighted. 
 
1.2 Research questions and issues 
1.2.1 Questioning the relevance of cooperatives  
Changes such as increased competition, changing policies, changing consumer profiles, interests or 
tastes are becoming too evident (Kyriakopoulos et al, 2004). As such, business organizations are 
forced to adopt their organizational structures and strategies to match such changes (Cook and 
Chaddad (2000); Evans and Meade (2005); Heit (2007); Kyriakopoulos et al (2004); O‘Connor 
(2001) and Sykuta and Cook (2001)). An increasing trend of structural changes and strategies such 
as consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint ventures and organisational 
changes such as strategic diversification, vertical integration, horizontal integration and conversions 
have also been reported in South Africa (Competition Commission, 2006). Chaddad and Cook 
(2004) show various types of cooperative models that have emerged mainly in developed countries 
such as the USA, New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands where policies have permitted such 
actions. The move towards more investor oriented models such as outright conversions to 
companies‘ raises questions on the merits and demerits of the cooperative model compared to the 
investor oriented models. More interestingly is whether the cooperative business model has merits 
in modern day business or has become obsolete? 
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According to Chaddad and Cook (2004), cooperatives and companies can best be viewed as two 
polar forms of business models. As a result, various questions arise as to why a business changes to 
another polar business model and how such a change affects the organisation and stakeholders 
involved. There are various reasons and motives for converting from a cooperative to a company. 
Various motivations and theories have been proposed to explain why cooperatives convert (see 
section 5.6). Cook (1995) attributes the ill defined property rights of traditional cooperatives as the 
main cause of conversions of cooperatives to other organisational models such as the NGCs or 
investor oriented firms. However, other reasons such as political factors, changes in the institutional 
arrangements and policies or other individual (either is rational or irrational to pursue personal 
benefits) also motivate such changes (Collins (1991); Jorgensen (2001) and Merlo (2001)). Thus 
empirical evidence is needed to ascertain why cooperatives convert and whether these conversions 
are an inevitable evolutionary process, or instigated by other motives? The decision to convert is 
made against other alternative actions such consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, 
joint ventures and organisational changes such as strategic diversification, vertical integration and 
horizontal integration. Against an understanding of the motives and reasons to convert a clear 
understanding is required on why some of these choices were overlooked. 
 
Changing from a cooperative to a company has many implications because by their very nature, 
cooperatives which appear user oriented seem like a totally different organisation from companies 
which are investor oriented (Standard Bank, 2006). Cooperatives have been known to mainly serve 
their members by providing a service. Thus their motivation is more closely tied to the financial 
health of the members as opposed to the profit motive of companies. Thus when cooperatives 
convert to companies, there are changes that members, management and the organisation have to 
face e.g. the members implications to the nature and extent of services from the re-structured 
organisation, issues pertaining to ownership (shares, dividends) and control. Questions on whether 
member ownership increases or decreases when cooperatives convert and also which of the two 
business model (company or cooperative) makes a better investment choice.  
 
When cooperatives convert to companies, the changes in the objective of the organisation have 
direct implications on management. Firstly in terms of how management shifts from a mindset of 
protecting the interests of members to that of being market oriented and investor oriented. Conflict 
of interests is expected when management tries to reconcile the economic self interest of 
shareholders who were previously members versus the interest of external investors. Such a conflict 
also raises the dilemma of the developmental imperative versus the economic or commercial 
imperative? In a cooperative, performance is based on the member‘s benefits as shown by the price 
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of products and services they receive from the cooperative. However, in companies, profit, return 
on investment, shareholders` value constitute the main performance measures. It is interesting to 
compare how modern commercial cooperatives compare to companies in such performance 
measures as well as the nature and extent of performance incentives especially ownership that they 
offer to management?  
 
1.2.2 Summary of research questions 
In summary the main objective and specific research question the study seeks to address is; 
i. How has the conversion to companies affected performance? Do cooperatives that have 
adopted the company business model perform better than cooperatives that never converted?  
 
Subsequently the study will also seek to address the following questions; 
ii. What are some of the external and internal reasons and motives that prompted the conversion? 
iii. Are cooperatives necessarily a less efficient organisational structure than the company 
business model? 
iv. Which challenges and opportunities were encountered during the process? 
v. What are the implications of such a change to members in as far as service obtained, shares, 
control, dividends and member‘s wealth is concerned?  
vi. How does the management reconcile the economic self interest of members versus the 
investors, or the developmental imperative versus the economic viability of the organisation?  
vii. What are the implications of such a change to investors in as far as shares, dividends and 
return to investments is concerned?  
viii. How has the organisation adapted to the needs of an advancing industrial society, that is, 
which organisations are more dynamic?  
ix. How do converted cooperatives differ to those that never converted in as far as organisation 
culture, management culture, style, competence and incentives? 
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
There are various schools of thought ranging from economics, sociology, political science to 
anthropology that seek to explain organisational behaviour or more commonly, collective action, 
group coordination or groups attempting to organise and create collective benefits (Coase (1937), 
Demsetz (1997), Fama (1980), Hart (1989), Knight (1957), Milgrom & Roberts (1990), Olson 
(1965), Putterman (1993), Williamson (1985)). The research applies the property rights approach 
which lies in the domain of the New Institutional Economics (NIE). The relevance of the NIE 
comes from the fact that it seeks to explain the basis of the firm, its structure and its significance for 
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a modern economic system, which form part of the key questions the research seeks to address. The 
property rights theoretical framework will be used to understanding issues pertaining to ownership 
and control whereas the business management approach will be the basis to understanding 
management culture, styles, competence and incentives as well as organisational culture.  
 
The property rights approach is mainly concerned with how the assignment of and costs of 
transferring property rights affects incentives and economic outcomes (Demsetz (1967); Demsetz 
(1983); Demsetz (1997); Harvey & Sykuta (2005)). Property rights being claim, control or 
ownership rights entitled to a member. Thus the central issue is mainly of ownership and control. 
Thus the organisational form is important in mitigating property rights issues, particularly the 
separation of residual claim rights, ownership and control rights in modern firms (Hendrikse & 
Veerman, 2001b). Thus it follows that organisational structures with well clearly defined property 
rights should perform better than organisational structures with ill defined property rights.  
 
The property rights structure of the firm could be altered over time. Restructuring of property rights 
is usually done to improve incentives and/or lower transaction costs with a view to making the firm 
more efficient. Actions such as consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint 
ventures and organisational changes such as strategic diversification, vertical integration, horizontal 
integration and conversions qualify as changes in property rights. However, sometimes such 
changes are not motivated or driven by pure efficiency considerations. For example, in the case of 
cooperatives, conversions can be driven by members or management with great bargaining power if 
it will be beneficial to them but detrimental to other members of the cooperative or the efficiency 
and performance of the cooperative.  
 
In today‘s dynamic environment, it is argued that dynamic organisations are more successful than 
organisations that do not adapt to change quickly and comprehensively ((Ensley et al (2006); Priem 
et al (1995)). Dynamic organisations tend to be innovative and respond to market opportunities and 
challenges with speed and comprehensiveness. Dynamism is can be shown by organisational 
culture, style and strategy, management and the property rights of the organisation. A full 
discussion in chapter four on these issues enlightens why some business organisations are expected 
to be more successful than others. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
Comparing cooperatives to companies is complicated by their different intrinsic nature. Thus, to 
draw up objective and sound conclusions, a balanced comparative methodology adapted from the 
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balanced score card is used. In today‘s dynamic business environment, there has been an increasing 
need for businesses to also track non financial measures in addition to the traditional financial 
ratios. Thus, in addition to financial accounting analysis, the study also uses a dynamism score card 
to investigate how cooperatives compare to companies in non financial business aspects such as 
management, property rights, organisational culture, style, strategy and structure. Figure 1 shows 
the different financial ratios that will be used to compare financial performance as well as the 
aspects that will be investigated to compare organisational dynamism. Primary data collected 
through semi structured interviews with the top management of the organisations will be used to 
investigate organisational dynamism. Financial statements of the cooperatives will be obtained from 
the Registrar of Cooperatives whereas those of companies will be acquired from published audited 
financial reports. 
 
Figure 1: Analytical framework 
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1.5 Limitations of the study 
There are several noteworthy limitations of the research. The generalizability of these research 
findings are limited because they are based on case studies which might not reflect or provide a 
conclusion for agribusiness in other regions or the whole country. More case studies need to be 
carried out to validate and compare the findings of this study. Secondly, because of data 
unavailability, the sample size is small resulting in various financial analysis limitations especially 
when averages are used for comparison. Finally, there are other critical factors that the study did not 
consider which could impact on the comparative performance of cooperatives to companies e.g. 
industry factors, political factors e.t.c.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
The study is divided into eight chapters as discussed below; 
 The first chapter introduces the research topic and articulates the research questions. A brief 
on the methodology and the motivation of the study are also explained.  
 Chapter two will serve as an explanation of the methodology and analysis applied in the 
study as well as the data and background information on the agribusinesses analysed 
 Chapter three is a background to cooperatives by discussing their evolution and various 
factors that have influenced their development. The chapter also includes a section on the 
changes and sometimes conflicting roles or imperatives of cooperatives in order to ascertain 
their role in today‘s modern economy. 
 Chapter four discuses performance as well as organisation dynamism, organisation culture, 
management culture and style, management incentives, management competence or ability 
in respect of their influence on performance. 
 Chapter five provides a review of the property rights approach which is the conceptual 
framework used to understand the conversions to companies. The Property rights approach 
will be applied to understand the formation and behaviour of cooperatives as compared to 
investor oriented business organisations.  
 Chapter six presents the results from the questionnaire empirical analysis and comparative 
dynamism.  
 Chapter seven presents the results from the financial analysis 
 Chapter eight presents the summary of the results, conclusion and presents suggestions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective in this chapter is to explain the data, methodology and analysis applied in the study. 
The first section outlines previous studies on cooperative performance and restructuring which gave 
an informed decision on the research methodology. These studies largely fall into two categories, 
i.e. (i) studies based on financial ratios and (ii) studies based on economic efficiency (Evans & 
Meade, 2005). The study will use financial accounting analysis, and a dynamism score card to 
indicate how cooperatives compare to companies in critical aspects such as management, property 
rights, organisational culture, style, strategy and structure. A description of the agribusiness selected 
for the study, questionnaire survey and financial accounting data will be provided. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of how each specific research question will be addressed. 
 
2.2 Previous studies on cooperative performance and restructuring 
Studies that have compared cooperatives to companies using financial ratios show mixed 
conclusions. Chan and Robb (1998), Lerman and Parliament (1990) and Parliament et al (1990) 
concluded that contrary to theoretical predictions cooperatives and companies were similarly 
leveraged and generated similar returns. In other cases, cooperatives financially outperformed 
comparable companies (this was especially true for dairy cooperatives because they are capital 
intensive and the farmer members involved were efficient). However, studies by Hardesty and 
Salgia (2004) and Schrader et al (1985) reveal no significant differences in financial performance 
but state that, large, diversified agribusiness companies had significantly higher returns on asset 
than cooperatives. 
 
Porter and Scully (1987) examined the relative efficiency of cooperatives and companies according 
to eight different measures (such as price, scale, and technical efficiency). Porter and Scully (1987) 
indicate that cooperative milk processors were on average only 75.5% as efficient as their company 
counterparts, and that by reorganising as companies, cooperative milk processors could raise output 
by 32.4% without requiring extra inputs. Porter and Scully (1987) attributed this inefficiency to 
problems with cooperative property rights, specifically the horizon, control, free rider, and portfolio 
problems as summarised by Cook (1995). Boyle (2004) investigated the economic efficiency of 
Irish dairy cooperatives from 1961 to 1987 and reports that cooperatives price their inputs as if they 
were profit maximisers (similar to companies) and did not price inefficiently as expected. 
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Doucouliagos and Hone (2000) indicate that the Australian dairy industry was dominated by two 
large Victorian cooperatives (Murray Goulburn and Bonlac), accounting for half the market and that 
dairy deregulation had encouraged improved industry performance because there was convergence 
in productivity levels across agribusinesses and states. Sullivan and Scrimgeour (1995) compare the 
performance of the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) to Nestle from 1969 to 1992 and concluded 
that Nestle appeared to be more efficient than the NZDB. This is in contrast to the dairy sector 
analyses of Lerman and Parliament (1990), and Parliament et al (1990). 
 
Thus from the studies surveyed, overall there is no clear support for the theoretical prediction that 
cooperatives will be less efficient and/or less profitable than companies (Evans and Meade, 2005). 
In any case, Chaddad and Cook (2004) show that certain inefficiencies predicted to arise in 
traditional cooperatives are being resolved with tradable cooperative ownership rights based on fair 
values. Comparison of cooperatives to companies has also come with criticism. Babb and Boynton 
(1981) argue that cooperatives represent the vertical integration of the producers‘ firms, thus, it is 
inappropriate to evaluate performance of the joint entity by examining data for only a portion of the 
entity. For example, a cooperative could be less profitable than a company and still be desirable to a 
member as long as the member‘s discounted income returns from the cooperative were greater than 
those from marketing the commodity directly or through a company. Babb and Boynton (1981) also 
indicate that critical stakeholders associated with cooperatives are more concerned with financial 
ratios than they are about measures of economic efficiency. Thus to address any bias that can result 
from conclusions based on only financial accounting analysis, the study will do a balanced 
comparison of the financial performance and other qualitative factors such as organisational 
dynamism. 
 
2.3. Research methods 
2.3.1 Financial accounting analysis 
Table 1 gives a description of how the financial ratios used in the study are calculated and 
interpreted. The industry benchmark based on the agribusiness benchmarking survey conducted in 
2006 and 2007 by Price Water and Coopers and will be used to provide comparable data on the 
performance of both cooperatives and agribusiness relative to the industry performance. However, 
the study takes note that the benchmarks are purely averages and not the best performance levels.  
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Table 1: How financial ratios are calculated and interpreted in the study 
Measure Calculation Interpretation 
1. PROFITABILITY   
Profit Margin Net farm Income plus interest minus family living and taxes divided by 
gross revenue 
 
The proportion of earnings or revenues that is operating profit and thus available to 
compensate debt and equity capital. indicates the operating margins and reflects the 
ability to generate revenues and control costs in such a way as to generate a profit 
Return On Assets (R.O.A) The net income generated by all assets, after labour has been 
compensated but before interest payments, divided by total assets 
A measurement of profitability that indicates the profitability per rand of assets, thus 
allowing comparisons over different size firms and different types of 
business/investment 
Return on Equity (R.O.E) The net income after all labour and interest charges, which is the residual 
return to the owners investment divided by the equity investment. 
A measurement of the return the owner of the business receives on his/her money 
invested. Can be compared to rates of return in other investment opportunities such as 
stocks, bonds, or savings accounts. a rate of return on equity that is less than the rate 
of return on assets indicates unproductive use of borrowed funds 
2. LIQUIDITY   
Current Ratio 
 
Calculated as current assets (Inventories, cash, accounts receivables, 
e.t.c) divided by current liabilities (operating loan payments, accounts 
payable, unpaid taxes due, this year‘s payments on term loans, accrued 
interest and rent, etc.) 
A basic indicator of short term debt servicing and/or cash flow capacity. It indicates 
the extent to which current assets, when liquidated, will cover current obligations. It 
does not predict the timing of cash flow during the year or the adequacy of future 
fund inflows in relation to outflows. 
3. SOLVENCY   
Debt to Asset ratio Total liability divided by total assets The basic leverage of the business, (i.e. what proportion of the total farm assets is 
owed to creditors). Measures the ability of the business to repay all financial 
obligations if all assets were sold. 
4. GROWTH   
Revenue growth Calculated as the annual increases in the total value of products and 
services produced by the business on an accrual basis  as reflected on 
principal the income statement. 
Reflects the growth of the business more specifically the income from sales and other 
sources available annually to cover expenses, loan payments, family living, income 
taxes, expansion, etc. 
Asset growth Calculated as the annual increases in the total value of assets as reflected 
on the balance sheet 
Reflects the growth of the business and its capital base from which income can be 
made from. 
5. FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY   
Asset turnover ratio 
 
Gross revenues divide by total assets Reflects how efficiently farm assets generate revenues, indicates the volume of 
business generated by the asset base (i.e. the flow of revenue through the asset 
pipeline). Can show wide variation depending on the proportion of owned land or 
other assets 
6. SHAREHOLDER VALUE   
Economic value added (EVA) {After tax operating income - Cost of Capital  } × Capital Invested                
Capital Invested                            
 
Economic value added is a value based financial performance measure, an investment 
decision tool and a performance measure reflecting the absolute amount of 
shareholder value created (Geyser & Liebenber, 2003) 
Source: Boehlje et al (1999). 
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2.3.2 Economic value added 
The key principle underlying EVA is that value is created when the return on an investment 
exceeds the total cost of capital that correctly reflects its investment risk. A positive EVA 
implies that the rate of return on capital must exceed the required rate of return (Hall & 
Geyser, 2004). Thus, EVA is the net operating profit minus an appropriate charge for the 
opportunity cost of all capital invested in an enterprise or project. EVA gives an objective 
comparison of shareholder value for both cooperatives and companies because it captures the 
following activities to create value that are common to cooperatives and companies (Hall & 
Geyser, 2004):  
 Generate higher cash flows from existing assets, without affecting its growth 
prospects or its risk profile. 
 Reinvest more and with higher excess returns, without increasing the riskiness of its 
assets. 
 Reduce the cost of financing its assets in place or future growth, without lowering the 
returns made on these investments.  
 
Geyser & Liebenberg (2003) state that when calculating EVA, the after-tax operating income 
has to be adjusted for operating leases, R&D expenses and one-time charges to compute the 
return on capital. At the minimum, three adjustments need to be made to capital invested 
when computing EVA — converting operating leases into debt, capitalizing R&D expenses 
and eliminating the effect of one-time or cosmetic charges (O‘Byrne, 1996). The cost of 
capital should be estimated based upon the market value of debt and equity in the firm, rather 
than book values (Kramer & Pushner, 1997). Like other financial performance measures, 
EVA has its own limitations, chiefly; 
 EVA on its own is inadequate for assessing a company‘s progress in achieving its 
strategic goals and in measuring performance.  
 EVA will not work as a value enhancement measure unless there is a commitment on 
the part of managers to make value maximization their primary objective (Geyser & 
Liebenberg, 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Questionnaire survey and the dynamism score card 
The questionnaire survey is used to collect data for investigating dynamism and for the scores 
used in the dynamism score card. The study classified the questionnaire into six sections 
mainly; (i) organisational information and culture, (ii) organisation restructuring and 
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dynamism (iii) performance information, (iv) ownership information (v) management culture, 
style, competence and incentives, and (vi) policies or legislation. The questionnaire survey 
will be carried out through semi structured interviews with top management of the 
agribusinesses. The respondents were part of the top management and thus the assumption is 
that they presented a fairly rational and valid sample for the study to analyse their 
organisation and management. 
 
The study compares dynamism in cooperatives versus companies using a dynamism score 
card (Table 2) that ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating a firm that is not dynamic at all 
and 100 indicating a highly dynamic company. The various agribusinesses were scored on 
four factors, which are, organisational strategy, organisational structure and culture, 
management and their property rights framework based on what theory and literature review 
suggested as dynamic practices. For example, firms with a BEE scoring of less than 40 points 
are given a dynamisms score of 1 whereas those with a BEE scoring of 41 to 65 were given a 
score of 2 and finally those with a BEE scoring of above 65 were given a dynamism score of 
3. The four factors, organisational strategy, organisational structure and culture, management 
and their property rights framework were all given the same weightings of 25%. More 
research needs to be done to develop an objective dynamism score card that could be used for 
analysing the dynamism of agribusinesses (There is none to date). 
 
Table 2: Dynamism score card 
Factor Specific criteria of comparing dynamism Score 
1 Organisational strategy Role in corporate social investment 3 
 Environmental sustainability or eco sensitive 
initiatives 
3 
 Nature of investments  5 
 BEE score card 3 
 Accounting reporting method 3 
 Changes in customers  4 
 Changes in product mix or services and value addition 4 
2 Management Management style 10 
 Management incentives and compensation 15 
3 Organisational structure and 
culture 
Organisational culture 10 
 Structure of the organisation 5 
 Restructuring actions in the past 5 years? 5 
 Type of investors 5 
4 Property rights framework Shares (price, how they are redeemed, classes) 10 
 Dividend policy 5 
 Voting principle 5 
 Capital structure 5 
 TOTAL DYNAMISM SCORE 100 
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2.4 Description of agribusinesses and data 
The study will use three cooperatives and four companies that were previously cooperatives. 
The cooperatives selected include the grain and oil seed cooperatives. However, because of 
diversification and ownership in other organisations, the agribusinesses are involved in 
various sectors such as grain, input supply and other downstream activities. For the sake of 
information privacy, the study will use the following names for the organisations, cooperative 
A, cooperative B, cooperative C, company A, company B, company C and company D. 
Company A was formed by a merger in 2005 involving two companies that were previously 
cooperatives but converted to companies in 1998. The same applies to Company B, whereas 
Company C has been a company since 1998 and Company D converted from a cooperative to 
a company in 1998. All the cooperatives have been in operation well before 1998 and are still 
registered as cooperatives. Figure 2 below shows the agribusinesses used for analysis and the 
duration of financial statements under review. 
 
Figure 2: Agribusinesses and the financial years considered 
 
    COOPERATIVE A 
      
    COOPERATIVE B 
  COOPERATIVE C 
 
 
     COMPANY D 
     COMPANY C 
 
   Merging partner 1 
   Merging Partner 2     COMPANY B 
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   Merging Partner 2       
          COMPANY A 
 
1998              2005           ...……2007
       (AMALGAMATION)            
 
Financial statements of the cooperatives will be obtained from the Registrar of Cooperatives, 
a subdivision of the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO). 
Whereas those of companies will be acquired from published audited annual financial 
reports. 
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2.5 Summary of the research questions and analysis 
Main objective and specific research question 
i. How has the conversion to companies affected performance? Do cooperatives that have 
adopted the company business model perform better than cooperatives that never 
converted?  
Financial accounting analysis will be used to assess the relative performance of the 
agribusinesses. A wide range of financial performance measures (profitability, liquidity, 
solvency, financial efficiency and growth) will inform the conclusion on how agribusinesses 
performed from the year 1998 to 2007. 
 
Subsequently the study will also seek to address the following research questions; 
ii. Why have cooperatives converted? What are some of the external and internal reasons 
and motives that prompted conversion? 
A questionnaire survey will be conducted to gain insight and acquire answers on the key 
reasons and motives. The property rights approach will form the basic literature to understand 
cooperative conversions.  
 
iii. Are cooperatives necessarily a less efficient organisational structure than the company 
business model? 
Financial efficiency ratios will be applied to investigate which agribusinesses where 
relatively more efficient or inefficient. 
 
iv. Which challenges and opportunities were encountered during the process? 
The questionnaire survey will be used to investigate company specific experiences with 
regard to the conversion process. The property rights approach will provide the literature 
review on some of the challenges and opportunities encountered during the conversion 
process, specifically ownership and control issues.. 
 
v. What are the implications of such a change to members in as far as services obtained, 
shares, control, dividends and member‘s wealth is concerned?  
EVA will be used to objectively compare shareholders value. In addition, the questionnaire 
survey will be used to show how cooperatives and companies differ in as far as control and 
ownership issues are concerned. 
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vi. How does the management reconcile the economic self interest of members versus the 
investors, or the developmental imperative versus the economic viability of the 
organisation?  
The property rights approach, specifically agency theory will inform the study on the issue of 
conflict of interest. However, the questionnaire interviews will prompt answers on how such 
conflicts of interests are addressed or handled if they do indeed exist.  
 
vii. What are the implications of such a change to investors in as far as shares, dividends 
and return to investments is concerned?  
The property rights approach will form the basic framework of analysis to understand the 
issue surrounding this question. However much of the answers will be obtained from the 
financial accounting analysis. 
 
viii. How has the organisation adapted to the needs of an advancing industrial society? 
The study will use the questionnaire to investigate dynamism and how the agribusinesses are 
adapting to the dynamic environment. A dynamism score card will be used to provide an 
objective comparison and score to compare how dynamic the organisations are. Management 
theory will provide the theoretical framework to understand organisational dynamism.  
 
ix. How do converted cooperatives differ to those that never converted in as far as 
organisation culture, management culture, style, competence and incentives? 
The study will use the questionnaire to investigate the different organisation cultures, 
management cultures, styles, competence and incentives. Management theory will provide 
the theoretical framework to understand the concept of organisational culture, management 
culture, style, competence and incentives.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNDERSTANDING AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The objective in this chapter is to give an insight of the role of institutions in organizational 
design (Institutions as defined as the rules of the game). It is important to discuss the 
historical development of agricultural co-operatives in South Africa in order to understand 
how and why cooperatives behave the way they do today. The chapter discuses the origin of 
cooperatives and the resulting impacts some policies had on their development in South 
Africa. For example, why there is a dominance of successful white commercial cooperatives 
as opposed to unsuccessful black cooperatives e.t.c. The chapter also discusses the 
cooperative thinking, nature and its essence. The core of the chapter is the discussion of the 
changes and sometimes conflicting imperatives of cooperatives. This discussion serves to 
inform on whether cooperatives do have a role or are obsolete in today‘s modern economy. 
 
3.2 Origin and development of cooperatives  
History has been shown to be of significant importance in the shaping of institutions and in 
explaining current institutional trends (Karaan (2004) and Van Niekerk (1998)). Cooperative 
arrangements and principles of cooperation have been shown to date back to the BC period 
(Van Niekerk, 1998). However, the popularity of the cooperative movement began with the 
application of cooperative principles to the business organization. Even though earlier 
unsuccessful attempts on cooperatives were made by individuals such as Owen, the Rochdale 
society of equitable pioneers formed in 1844 is widely acknowledged and publicised as the 
first successful cooperative (Birchal (2003); Ortmann & King (2007a); Ortmann & King 
(2007b) and Van Niekerk (1998)). 
 
Van Niekerk (1998) states that the Rochdale society of equitable pioneers was formed by a 
group of 28 weavers and artisans in Rochdale, England. The underlying reason being to work 
together and take advantage of economies of scale by opening their own store selling food 
items that they could not otherwise afford individually. In order to avoid failure as was the 
case with other groups that attempted cooperative actions earlier, they designed the Rochdale 
principles which are still the underlying principles that today‘s cooperatives are based. The 
Rochdale principles are discussed below (ICA, 2008); 
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 Open membership; The years around the establishment of the Rochdale cooperative 
in 1844 coincided with poverty, misery, lack of schools and housing, economic 
individualism and the industrial revolution. Almost every other form of organisation 
at the time was created to discriminate to ensure that its benefits went to its members 
who were of the same class, gender, or religion. However, by having open 
membership the cooperative was designed to be accessible to the poor and thus 
serving as a developmental organisation.  
 Democratic control (one person, one vote); The one person, one vote element was a 
clear principle that the cooperative was committed to democracy which did not 
separate or give powers to different individuals based on their wealth or power. The 
co-operative also allowed for equality of opportunity for both men and women to own 
shares. 
 Distribution of surplus in proportion to trade; Profits to the user owner set co-
operatives apart from other firms which pay profits to the owners of capital. The 
emphasis on co-operatives was the patronage of its members as compared to their 
capital. 
 Payment of limited interest on capital; The intent of the pioneers was to adequately 
reward capital but to use the majority of profits to reward usage. The other 
distinguishing element was that shares in the co-operative were maintained at par 
value to which interest would be paid, rather than the shares being decided in the 
market.  
 Political and religious neutrality. This principle was added because of Owen, who 
held a wide range of views on societies which were very progressive at the time but a 
number of them were repugnant to many religious groups. As a result, the Rochdale 
co-operative adopted this principle to ensure that the society did not involve issues 
which had no relationship to the co-operative.  
 Cash trading (no credit extended). One of the major causes of failure in earlier 
attempts of cooperatives had been the extending of credit to members. Thus the co-
operative felt strongly that it would serve its members better if it educated them to 
budget their wages and buy at the co-operative.  
 Promotion of education; This principle appeared in 1854 after the Registrar allowed 
co-operatives to set aside money for education. Prior to that the co-operative had 
illegally set aside money for education. Initially the pioneers focused on educating 
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their members through providing courses, adult classes, lectures, newspapers and a 
library. Through their education programs, the pioneers were to give their members 
the tools to get better jobs and gain newer skills. Later, as public education filled their 
role, the co-ops concerned themselves much more with the role of cooperative 
education.  
 
The success of the Rochdale cooperative resulted in a wave of cooperative formations around 
the world. Agriculture cooperatives were mainly more popular in the USA and Netherlands, 
from as early as around 1876 and 1877 respectively. In South Africa, cooperatives are 
reported to have been registered even before the union of the then four main provinces, Natal, 
Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State which led to the formation of South Africa in 1910 
(Van Niekerk,1998). The Pietermaritzburg consumer cooperative that was registered in 1892 
in the Natal province in terms of the Companies Act is argued to be the first probable 
cooperative. According to Van Niekerk (1998) cooperatives were mainly involved in three 
main areas of business  
 the purchase and sale of agricultural inputs and equipment 
 the purchase, storage and subsequent sale of agricultural commodities  
 transport services  
 financial intermediaries to commercial farmers at subsidized interest rates 
 
3.3 Policy, economic and regulation influences
1
  
Prior to the union of South Africa, legislation that directly affected cooperatives such as the 
Company‘s Act (there was no Cooperatives Act until 1908) and the Natal Agricultural 
Development Act of 1904 had little impact on the positive development of cooperatives. The 
Companies Act is argued to have been unsuitable as cooperatives could not comply with its 
stringent legal provisions. On the other hand, even though the Natal Agricultural 
Development Act of 1904 was empowered to grant loans to cooperatives, its influence was 
limited because it was not adequately used or used at all. Even though there already were a 
few agricultural cooperatives when the Cape Development Act of 1905 was passed, it 
resulted in a large number of cooperatives being established in the Cape Province within a 
few years because it made available easy loans to agriculture cooperatives. However, a large 
number of these cooperatives failed. 
                                                 
1
 This section relies heavily on Van Niekerk (1998). 
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The Transvaal Land Bank Act of 1907 played a huge role in the development of cooperative 
legislation. The Transvaal Land Bank Act of 1907 led to the creation of the land bank for the 
Transvaal that granted loans to cooperatives and enabled cooperatives to regulate their 
financial affairs more easily. The Transvaal Land Bank Act of 1907 was passed as the 
Cooperatives Act of 1908 in 1908. This act contributed to the successful development of 
cooperatives in the Transvaal because of its two provisions that were included to avoid the 
shortcomings which emerged in other provinces. The two provisions were (i) unlimited 
liability of members jointly and severally, and (ii) a superintendent would be appointed to do 
regular inspection of cooperatives. However, the unlimited liability lost popularity because 
many members lost a significant amount of money when some of these cooperatives failed. 
 
According to Van Niekerk (1998), after the union of South African states, the Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa established in 1912 was fundamental in the development 
of cooperatives through the financing of cooperatives. The passing of the Land Bank Act of 
1913 saw increased support to white commercial farmers and cooperatives through the 
provision of subsidized credit at rates of interest that were cheaper than those available from 
commercial banks. The Land Bank was prohibited from making such finance available to 
other business organisations (Van Niekerk, 1998). 
 
From the union of South Africa in 1910 to the first Cooperative Society Act, Act 28 of 1922, 
several cooperatives were established but several others also disappeared. The shortage of 
inspectors and the distrust of farmers in the cooperative philosophy and its application was 
regarded as the key reasons for the failure of cooperatives. The first Cooperative Society Act, 
Act 28 of 1922 was the first legislation to control cooperatives in all provinces in South 
Africa. This gave the registrar the opportunity to treat all cooperatives in a uniform manner 
and steer them in the same direction.  
 
The Cooperative Societies Act, Act 28 of 1922 was amended in 1925 when the Cooperatives 
Societies Amendment Act, Act 38 of 1925 was passed in order to strengthen the bargaining 
power of cooperatives and to give them full control over the products in the interest of all 
farmers. This act helped farmers to secure input supply and output marketing services. 
However, because of the world depression of 1929 to 1933, the South African economy and 
agriculture were affected negatively in terms of dropping prices. Cooperative members 
increased even though revenues decreased as they sought refuge in cooperatives. This lead to 
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the birth and reinforcement of the attempts to extend the application of compulsory sale of 
produce by means of agriculture cooperatives. Thus the 1933 Commission of inquiry which 
contributed significantly to the passing of the Marketing Act 1937 and the Cooperative 
Society Act, Act 29 of 1939 was appointed to investigate the cooperatives and agricultural 
credit. 
 
The Marketing Act 1937 presented a new era to agriculture and agriculture cooperatives that 
would later shape how cooperatives behave even today. The Marketing Act of 1937 
introduced different types of marketing schemes for different agricultural commodities. The 
powers available under these schemes included monopoly buying, single channel exports, 
control over agro-processing and quantitative controls over imports etc. The Act appointed 
control boards as the sole marketing organisations which in turn favoured cooperatives 
against non-cooperative organisations to serve as agents for the control board. The economic 
reason behind such action was argued to be the depression that had caused low prices, which 
meant that farmers individual bargaining power was low, so control boards were seen as the 
only logical means by which agriculture producers could strengthen their bargaining power, 
reduce the gap between producer and consumer prices as well as obtain more satisfactory and 
stable prices for their products.  
 
However, in employing control boards, the price forming functions of cooperatives were 
destroyed. The fixed prices as set by the control boards meant that all producers, members or 
non members received the same price for their products. Thus cooperatives strongest 
economic argument for their existences at the time, the bargaining for better prices, fell. 
Therefore the incentives to become cooperative members also disappeared. However, their 
existence did not disappear? The control boards employed agents to undertake the physical 
handling of products (collecting, grading storing and distribution) and in most cases 
cooperatives were employed as the agents. Hence, the result was that cooperatives enjoyed 
state support and thrived during this era with the majority of cooperatives becoming 
monopolies in different key agricultural sectors in the marketing of agriculture produce. 
However, perhaps because of the biased nature of the government and political economy at 
the time white commercial farmers tended to be primarily favoured to access such services, 
support and incentives than black farmers. Thus the cooperatives that thrived were 
commercial cooperatives that were predominantly white as opposed to the developing sector, 
which is predominantly black.  
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The Cooperative Societies Act, Act 28 of 1922 gave way to the Cooperative Society Act, Act 
29 of 1939 in 1939. The Cooperative Society Act, Act 29 of 1939 included recommendations 
of the 1933 Commission of inquiry into cooperatives and agricultural credit. After 1939 to 
around 1960 the trend in cooperative development changed. Contrary to popular opinion that 
cooperatives should only serve a certain magisterial district and undertake a restricted series 
of functions, there was a noticeable trend in the direction of larger cooperatives expanding 
their branches and depots over large areas with a central head office. This was especially the 
case of most grain cooperatives in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and to a lesser extent in 
the Eastern, Southern and Western Cape. The principle of unlimited liability lost popularity 
and the number of cooperatives with unlimited liability reduced in numbers as most 
converted to limited liability.  
 
In 1963 a Commission of inquiry was set up which led to the publication of the Steenkamp 
report in 1967 which was fundamental to the formulation of the Cooperative Act, Act 91 of 
1981. The Cooperative Act, Act 91 of 1981 provided for the establishment, incorporation, 
functioning, winding up and dissolution of cooperatives, and the appointment of the Registrar 
of cooperatives. The Cooperative Act, Act 91 of 1981 incorporated some agreements that 
were reached between the government and the South African Agriculture Union in 1979 
based on recommendations made by the Steenkamp Report in 1967.  
 
The Marketing of Agricultural Products Act, No 47 of 1996 led to the deregulation of the 
agriculture sector accompanied by reduced state support and intervention (Groenewald, 2000) 
and Vink & Kirsten (2000)). Control boards and marketing schemes were disbanded. This 
resulted in a shift to a market economy that sought to allow free and fair participation by all 
the different stakeholders. As a result, organizations were exposed to increased competition 
from both local and international stakeholders (Doyer et al (2007); Groenewald (2000) and 
Vink & Kirsten, (2000)). The transition from a regulated era with massive state support to a 
much more competitive deregulated market economy era meant that cooperatives had to be 
competitive if they were to survive. Cooperatives no longer enjoyed the support and 
preferential treatment that they were accorded as agents for control boards and support from 
the land bank. Thus a number of cooperatives faced viability challenges or the pressure of 
competition (AGRITV (2003); Groenewald (2000); Kruger (2000); Ortmann & King 
(2007b); Ortmann (2005); Ortmann (2002)). Thus there was a noticeable trend in various 
restructuring actions such as consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint 
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ventures and organisational changes such as strategic diversification, vertical integration, 
horizontal integration and conversions with reported cases of a number of cooperatives 
closing down (Competition Commission, 2006). 
 
History of the policies and legislation show that biased support was given to commercial 
agriculture cooperatives which were predominantly white as opposed to the developing 
cooperatives that are predominantly black. Thus the development of cooperatives in South 
Africa is best described by two parallel advancements, successful agricultural commercial 
cooperatives versus hugely unsuccessful cooperatives in the developing sector (Holloway et 
al (2000); Kirsten & Satorious (2002) and Van der Walt (2005)). However, this is not to say 
that there haven‘t been any cooperative failures in the commercial sector, cases of failure 
have been reported from as early as 1905 (Van Niekerk, 1998). In a recent study of a sample 
of 54 registered cooperatives in Limpopo province, Van der Walt (2005) found that reasons 
provided for their failure are poor management, lack of training, conflict among members and 
the lack of funds, and operations never started after registration. 
 
When the new ANC led government came into play in 1996, inequality was viewed as one of 
the main challenges and issues to be dealt with (ANC, 1994). Thus, the growth and support of 
co-operatives, especially among historically disadvantaged South Africans, was taken as a 
strategy to alleviate poverty and create jobs (Mpahlwa (2005) and Philip (2003)). In light of 
such endeavours, the Cooperative Act, Act 91 of 1981 was considered to be unsuitable to 
achieve such a strategy mainly because (Ortmann & King, 2007b); 
 the focus was too much on large, commercial agricultural co-operatives only 
 the definition of co-operative was not adequate 
 compliance with co-operative principles was not explicitly required from cooperatives 
 the registration process was complicated 
 members' interested were not sufficiently protected. 
 
Based on these shortcomings and the need to enforce cooperatives as a strategy to fight 
poverty and create jobs, the Cooperatives Act, Act 14 of 2005, which is mainly characterized 
by the following purpose and provisions was passed (DTI, 2008); 
 A wide variety of primary cooperatives can register in terms of this Act (including 
agricultural, consumer, housing, worker, financial services, burial society, and service 
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cooperatives), as well as secondary cooperatives (formed by two or more primary 
cooperatives to provide sectoral services to its members) and tertiary cooperatives 
(whose members are secondary cooperatives, and whose objective is to advocate and 
engage state institutions and the private sector on behalf of its members).  
 Enable co-operatives to register and acquire a legal status separate from their 
members and facilitate the provision of targeted support for emerging co-operatives, 
particularly those owned by women and black people.  
 Promote equity and greater participation by black persons, especially those in rural 
areas, women, persons with disability and youth in the formation and management of 
co-operatives. 
 Facilitate the provision of support programmes that target emerging cooperatives. 
 
Despite being introduced recently, the Cooperatives Act 2005, Act 14 of 2005 was criticised 
for its limitations and the failure to take note of international cooperative trends (Agricultural 
Business Chamber (2008) and Lyne & Collins (2007)). Lyne and Collins (2007) argue that 
the Cooperatives Act 2005, Act 14 of 2005 perpetuates the notion of traditional co-
operatives, ignoring trends in developed countries where co-operative legislation has been 
amended to encourage investment by patron and non-patron members. Admittedly, trends 
originating in developed nations may not be appropriate in developing countries, but the 
underlying problems that these changes aimed to address will also constrain development-
oriented co-operatives in South Africa. This notion is further stressed by the Agricultural 
Business Chamber (2008) who state that their argument to reconsider such issues were not 
considered when passing the ACT as the argument turned political. However, experience 
from developed countries and in most commercial cooperatives in South Africa indicate that 
traditional co-operatives always come short at raising sufficient capital to finance investments 
needed to compete in the changing and competitive global food markets because of their 
institutional arrangements discouraged equity investors (Agricultural Business Chamber, 
2008). 
 
3.4 Cooperative thinking, nature and essence 
3.4.1 Development imperative  
Even though the existence or formation of cooperatives is argued to be motivated by 
economic reasons, there is wide acknowledgement that cooperatives are founded as a 
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development or social reforming institution (Birchall (2003); Hagerman (2005); Krivokapi-
Skoko (2002); Mooney & Gray (2002); McKee (2006)). The key drivers to the formation of 
the Rochdale cooperative and earlier cooperatives appears strongly to have been motivated by 
the developmental need of the members at the time by protecting and assisting its poor 
members to survive the rising prices (Birchall (2003) and Van Nierkek (1998)). Birchall 
(2003) also states that cooperatives were viewed as a revolution to the capitalist system of the 
time. The Rochdale cooperative principles illustrate a cooperative as development oriented 
and as a means of reducing poverty. Because they were open to new members, did not require 
people to invest large amounts of capital, and tended to share economic results equitably, 
cooperatives were argued to have a tendency to benefit the poor. Thus their development 
imperative was potentially strong as compared to other forms of economic organization, 
especially if their values and principles were respected.  
 
The Rochdale principles have since been changed and most cooperatives are adopting 
cooperative principles as stated by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA, 2008). The 
new cooperative principles still regard a cooperative as a development organisation but also 
emphasise the need for cooperatives to be economically viable if they are to satisfy their 
development imperative (ICA, 2008). Thus the commercial imperative is not viewed as the 
primary goal of the cooperative but the means to assist members and member communities to 
be developed. Birchal (2003) states that the origins of the now successful cooperative credit 
banking and agricultural cooperation in Germany started as a bid to distribute food to the 
desperate farmers around the 1840s. In Denmark, Canada and the United States, agricultural 
cooperatives enabled a whole class of small farmers to reach export markets whereas 
throughout Europe, Raiffeisen-type rural cooperative banks were providing a means of saving 
and borrowing for farmers (Birchall, 2003). New generation agricultural cooperatives in the 
United States have created wealth for poor farmers in the Mid-West through adding value to 
members produce (McKee (2007) and Altshul (2002)). Urbanchuk (2007) states that the 
impact of cooperative ownership of ethanol production in the USA is as much as 40 percent 
larger than the impact of an absentee owned corporate plant to the community. Various other 
studies indicate the development imperative of cooperatives (see Altshul (2002); Cooperative 
Care (2002); Munkner (2001); Murray (2006); Patel (2001); Parnell (2001); Taylor et al 
(2002)). 
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In the context of South Africa, there has been a resurgence of the co-operative movement 
with a strong focus on the emerging cooperatives. Cooperatives are acknowledged as an 
organization that could empower the poor and address the challenges of unemployment 
(Mpahlwa (2005) and Philip (2003)). Barraket (2001) gives a comprehensive view of the role 
cooperatives play in community development or revitalisation. FAO (2001) and Munkner and 
Shrestha (1999) show that milk cooperatives in Bangladesh have been instrumental in 
poverty reduction among the landless and small or marginal farmers. Birchall 2003 shows the 
role that cooperatives have played to the tribal communities (Tribal communities are among 
the world‘s poorest people). Ruben and Lerman (2004) argue that despite the relative merits 
of individual farming to cooperatives in Nicaragua, peasants still patronize cooperatives 
because cooperatives assist in addressing uncertainty associated with land ownership as well 
as to capture the benefits of rural development programs. Other notable studies of 
cooperatives in developing countries include those by Cabo and Rebelo (2006), Francesconi 
and Ruben (2007), Gertler (2001), Glasbergen (2000), Maharjan and Fradejas (2006), 
Nickson (2000), Schwettmann (2001), Parnell (2001) and Zeller (2006)). Despite the above 
arguments, Munkner (2001) argues that cooperatives often do not benefit the poorest of the 
poor because they need members who are able to pool their resources in order to reach a 
common goal which could be out of reach for the poor.  
 
3.4.2 Political imperative  
In their historical origin, cooperatives were clearly also political institutions. Birchal (2003) 
and Van Nierkek (1998) show that the motivation of the Owenites and the formation of the 
Rochdale cooperatives appears to have been motivated by the need to fight the capitalist 
system of the time. As a result, the development of cooperatives generated intense political 
opposition from competing economic interests. Ruben and Lerman (2004) state that 
cooperatives can only succeed in the right environment, as their success or failure was 
affected by the culture, the politics, the system of land tenure, level of education, and 
prevailing ethical standards in a country. In addition, Birchall (2003) indicates that the 
political structures within a country frequently influenced cooperatives or used them to justify 
political means.  
 
The political imperative of cooperatives is also best illustrated by Olson (1960) through the 
Kirkpatrick type of cooperatives. The cooperative was controlled by a legally separate 
political and lobbying organisation not by the patrons themselves. For example, the Illinois 
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agricultural association, held all the voting stock in the cooperative business and mutual 
insurance companies that were associated with it. In another case, the cooperative marketing, 
supply and insurance companies associated with the Farm Bureau in Illinois were run by an 
organisation that was legally and completely separate. The organisation had legislative and 
lobbying objectives rather than the business or economic objectives cooperatives and mutual 
insurance companies normally had.  
 
Olson (1960) states that the system was set up in such a way that the business purposes of the 
purely economic parts of the system would always be completely subordinate to the political 
part of the system. Thus even if cooperatives had their own objectives, they could not escape 
the political influence and could be used to pursue political objectives. Political and lobbying 
organisations usually had enough strength and influence to attract membership. For example 
the farm bureau did not allow some of the business enterprises to sell their products to anyone 
who was not and would not become a member of the political organisation (Olson, 1960). 
Farmers therefore realised that they were bound to lose out patronage dividends or other non 
collective business benefits and a lot of money if they did not join such political groups.  
 
In South Africa, cooperatives have been used as a political tool. The era of control boards 
under the Marketing Act of 1937 and the biased support of the land bank indicates the 
political imperative of cooperatives. The political environment at the time was biased towards 
furthering the interest of whites as opposed to blacks (Van Niekerk, 1998). During the era of 
control boards in South Africa, white commercial agricultural cooperatives were the main 
organisations employed as agents for the control boards, they also received favourable 
financial support from the land bank. In addition, further political bias is illustrated by the 
allocation of low interest loans to cooperatives which were not offered to other business 
organisations. 
 
Cooperatives have shown that they require enabling legislation to be successful, for which 
they need political influence. Ruben and Lerman (2004) show that in Nicaragua, under the 
Soviet system cooperatives were taken over by the state or reduced to be mere agencies of the 
government, whereas under fascist dictatorships, they were taken over, their assets stripped, 
their leaders murdered, imprisoned, or exiled. Birchall (2003) shows that agricultural 
cooperatives began a close relationship with government in many countries, regardless of 
ideology; as shown in the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, France e.t.c. 
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Agriculture was seen as too important a part of national economies to be left entirely to 
market forces and thus warranted political intervention especially in light that cooperatives 
were often the preferred alternative to capitalist owners who might exploit natural 
monopolies in the food production chain.  
 
3.4.3 Commercial imperative 
Barton (1989), Cook (1995), Hind (1997), Henehan and Anderson (2001), and Schrader 
(1989) suggest that cooperatives have a strong commercial imperative and their motivation is 
economic. During the Rochdale cooperative era, cooperatives were means by which 
individuals could acquire lower purchase prices, higher sales prices, and larger cash 
dividends (Birchall, 2003). Though such motivations could have been developmental or 
political there is a strong sense of the economic need of the individuals at the time. Cook and 
Chaddad (2000), Fulton and Giblings (2000) and Krivokapic-Skoko (2002) show that 
globalization and agro-industrialisation has increased competition and resulted in a changing 
market environment. Thus, to be successful, cooperatives just like any other organisation 
have had to adopt their organisational structure or strategies. Of major note is that it has led to 
a conflict on how to balance the cooperatives` duty to maximise cooperative member 
individual benefits and interests yet being be a profitable, well-financed and a growing 
business which is core to survival in today‘s business environment. 
 
Cook and Chaddad (2000) state that strategies to build a competitive edge can comprise 
engaging in value-added processing, brand name development, and entry into international 
markets, e.t.c. These strategies have been shown to result in more capital intense, larger and 
more often commercial oriented cooperatives in order to finance such actions. The key issue 
for co-operatives has been shown to be running successful businesses while adhering to the 
co-operative principles (ICA, 2008). Although the primary goal of a co-operative 
organisation is to provide a service to members and not to maximize profits, co-operatives 
have come under pressure to be profitable or at least generate sufficient revenue to cover 
expenses, lower costs and ensure its survival and growth. Thus cooperatives appear to have a 
strong commercial imperative. 
 
Piesse et al (2004) argue that grain cooperatives in South Africa are now market oriented and 
behave more like companies. Initially, cooperatives were used as instruments of government 
policy, but when the agricultural sector was deregulated many cooperatives disappeared, 
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whilst those with strong leadership and good management began to prosper as autonomous 
businesses (Van Niekerk, 1998). In addition, Piesse et al (2004) show that cooperatives have 
responded by changing the focus of their activities and increasing their economic efficiency.  
 
Cote et al (2000), Evans and Meade (2005), and Henehan and Anderson (2001) state that the 
primary underlying motivation to form a cooperative is basically the same as forming any 
other business. However, in an investor oriented firm (IOF), an individual investor seeks out 
an investment opportunity yielding the greatest growth potential or highest return on 
investment possible and often they will have little or no direct involvement in the business 
itself, other than as a shareholder. On the contrary, the prospective member-owners of 
cooperatives are frequently not simply seeking the highest possible return on their 
investment, but a set of returns associated with becoming a member which may include 
services, better prices, user control, access to markets, along with a return on capital invested 
(Henehan and Anderson, 2001).  
 
Cooperatives have also been shown to grow to an extent that they behave more like 
commercial oriented units. For example, approximately 60% of the French banking sector is 
formed by co-operatives and mutual associations, which are very successful businesses while 
remaining true to the values of the co-operative movement (ICA, 2008). But it is clear that 
there would not be successful businesses if they had not embraced some commercial 
imperative concepts. ICA (2008) argues that the unique characteristics that differentiates 
cooperatives from other enterprise structures is its dual nature that is they are business 
enterprises based on a membership-owned model. Thus cooperatives are an alternative 
organisation pursuing successful commercial business practices based on the values of self-
help, self-responsibility, solidarity, user control and democracy.  
 
3.5 Summary: Are cooperatives relevant or obsolete 
Changes such as increased competition, changing policies, changing consumer profiles, 
interests or tastes are becoming too evident (Kyriakopoulos et al, 2004). As such, business 
organizations are forced to adopt their organizational structures and strategies to match such 
changes (Cook and Chaddad (2000); Evans and Meade (2005); Heit (2007); Kyriakopoulos et 
al (2004); O‘Connor (2001) and Sykuta and Cook (2001)). Cooperatives are hence forced to 
pursue competitive strategies and be dynamic in response to structural and other changes in 
the market place. Clearly, such trends indicate a move towards more competitive oriented 
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business models. Van Nierkek (1998) argues that the primary objective of cooperatives is to 
facilitate economic interaction through collective action and enabling members to gain access 
to a certain market service or asset, take advantage of economies and partake in activities 
they would never afford or manage individually. Thus a co-operative has inherent objectives 
of assisting members to enable them to earn profits in their own right but not for the 
cooperative to necessarily become a profit organization. Therefore the development 
imperative of co-operatives is achieved through the facilitation of economic activities by the 
empowerment of members to participate as businesses.  
 
An organization with a purely social or development objective would focus on service 
delivery for no gain or profit. This is especially true for where the market system fails and 
does not provide a specific service and where the community consequently comes together to 
provide that service collectively and in this way also enhances the general livelihood and 
alleviate poverty within the community (Birchall, 2003). This was the case in earlier 
formations of cooperatives around the world (especially the Rochdale period) and in some 
parts of the developing sector of the South African economy. However, in today‘s 
competitive business environment, challenges to sustain the organisation and enable it to 
service its members has meant that cooperatives are under pressure to adopt a commercial 
approach and behave like viable business organisations in order to meet the members` needs 
(Ortmann & King (2007a, b)).  
 
Given the above insights, are cooperatives still relevant? Firstly because of their essence, 
cooperatives have a social objective to a certain extent, thus tend to get captured by the 
government, and are used as instruments of government policy where they get 
bureaurocratised and in the end lose their efficiency and effectiveness. Some of the 
government actions emanate from the strong and sound argument of the role cooperatives can 
play in development. However, if the socialist agenda or their development imperative is 
allowed to dominate without a closer concern for their sustainability, co-operatives then 
become irrelevant as economic entities. Conclusively, in order for commercial cooperatives 
to be relevant as commercial and economic entities, South Africa needs to adopt business 
conducive and supportive policy as has been the case in developed countries such USA, 
Netherlands, and Canada e.t.c. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ORGANISATIONAL PERFOMANCE: 
DYNAMISM AND FINANCIAL PERFOMANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter four discusses the literature on organisational dynamism and financial performance. 
Profitability, liquidity, solvency, efficiency and growth ratios are used as the key financial 
performance measures to compare agribusiness performance, taking into consideration the 
inherent differences between cooperatives and companies. In addition, dynamism as shown 
by the firms` management, organisation strategies organisation culture will be discussed in 
this chapter. Dynamism is an important determinant of business performance and explains 
how organisations adapt to the dynamic business environment and why some businesses 
organisations perform better than others.  
 
4.2 Organisational performance 
4.2.1 Financial performance 
Financial performance is fundamental to the success and sustainability of any business. 
Despite several measures of success that business organizations strive for such as status, 
market share e.t.c., the bottom line for any business is to be financially successful, otherwise 
the business becomes unsustainable in the long run (Boehlje et al (1999); Davidson (2005); 
McKee (2006); Miller et al (2001)). The key financial performance measures that are mainly 
used by most businesses are profitability, liquidity or solvency, efficiency and growth ratios. 
These measures are discussed in table one.  
 
Due to the differences in the nature and essence of companies and cooperatives, their 
comparative financial performance is argued to have different interpretations and 
expectations (Kyriakopoulos et al, 2004)). Traditionally, profitability is thought to be the real 
economic goal of the firm. Cooperatives are not considered to be return on investment 
maximizers like companies, their members traditionally expect to receive their returns in the 
form of improved market access or lower input prices, rather than a direct return on their 
equity investment in the cooperative (Henehan, & Anderson (1989); Henehan, & Anderson 
(2001)). In addition, Kyriakopoulos et al (2004) state that cooperatives operate differently 
from companies because of the three basic cooperative principles that define the essence of a 
cooperative organisation mainly: user-owned, user-benefit and user-control. These service 
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benefits reduce the cooperatives‘ return on investment by lowering revenues and increasing 
costs. Comparatively, companies have a clear objective to maximize profitability because of 
their built in goal of maximizing shareholder value. Mixed evidence has been found 
regarding this interpretation (Evans & Meade, 2005). Some cooperatives have been shown to 
outperform companies in terms of profitability (Boyle (2004); Babb & Boynton (1981); 
Hardesty & Salgia (2004); Lerman & Parliament (1990)). In addition, in today‘s challenging 
business environment, cooperatives have been pressured to be profitable in order to best serve 
their members interest.  
 
Both cooperatives and companies aim to achieve financial growth over time. However, 
expectations are that cooperative growth is constrained because of the inherent weaknesses of 
the cooperative business model, chiefly their constrained capacity to raise equity capital 
(Cook, 1995). Thus, as long as cooperatives are best serving the primary interest of their 
members, the expectations is that profit, revenue and asset growth are secondary. The same 
concept applies with regard to the liquidity and solvency ratios of the cooperative. However, 
because of the challenging business environment, both companies and cooperatives are 
expected to maintain sound and sustainable liquidity and solvency ratios. Finally, because 
cooperatives have the ultimate drive to service members in the best way possible, they search 
for the best ways to provide services or products in the cheapest way possible even though 
this could be beneficial to the members it could lead to the inefficiency of the cooperative as 
an organisation (Porter & Scully, 1987). On the other hand, companies have the ultimate 
drive to be efficient in order to perform and increase profitability. 
 
Despite the relative importance of financial performance measures it is necessary for business 
organisations to develop a benchmarking tool that provides goals for realistic improvement 
and helps the business to understand the changes required for improving financial 
performance (Porter (1980) & PWC (2006)). Benchmarking is important mainly because it 
(O‘Dell (1993) & Watson (1992)); 
 Provides a reliable way of assessing the relative performance of the business. 
 Improves strategic planning and provides an assessment of the organization's 
strengths and weaknesses 
 Establishes challenging performance goals and stimulates better performance 
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It is of great importance to choose the appropriate type of benchmarking. The following 
describe the benchmarking methods that can be used (O‘Dell (1993) & Watson (1992)); 
 External benchmarking identifies organizations providing similar products or 
services and compares their results. The study uses external benchmarking as 
calculated by the PWC agribusiness benchmarking survey. 
 Internal benchmarking compares an organization's own similar processes or 
products. This is the easiest type of benchmarking to perform, but is limited to the 
organization's best internal practices. It should be considered as a means of 
establishing a baseline performance that will later be used for comparison to external 
performance and to identify the scope of improvement opportunities  
 Analogous benchmarking is considered the most difficult and most desirable type of 
benchmarking as comparison is made with a world-class organization which may be 
performing a similar process but in a different field. Such organizations are hard to 
identify and may require adjustment in accounting and other practices  
 
4.2.2 Organisational dynamism 
Organisational dynamism refers to the ability for organisations to respond to the 
unpredictable and rapidly changing business environment (Ensley et al, 2006). Organisational 
dynamism has a significant impact on performance. In today‘s dynamic environment, 
organisations have to be dynamic and embrace changes with speed and comprehensiveness to 
be successful (Leach, 2003). Organisation dynamism is shown by the changes the 
organisation undertakes in response to or in anticipation of market changes (Priem et al, 
1995).  
 
Ensley et al (2006) indicates that in today‘s modern dynamic environment, organisations that 
consider more alternatives tend to outperform those who do not. Thus flexibility in decision 
making is important for organisational dynamism. Eisenhardt (1989) found that the behaviour 
of effective decision makers working in dynamic environments is characterized by speed and 
comprehensiveness. These results suggest that effective decision makers maintain 
sophisticated information search and processing routines, whereas less effective decision 
makers resort to using less complex routines to cope with the time pressure and stress that is 
brought about by the uncertain and rapidly changing environmental conditions. Because the 
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decision making function is mainly allocated to management, dynamisms can best be 
explained by looking at management behaviour (Porter, 1991).  
 
The culture, structure and strategies of the business model also affect organisational 
dynamism and are discussed in the next section. However, for organisational culture, 
structure and strategies and management to be effective in the organisation, the policies and 
business environment have to be appropriate. For example, the deregulation of markets and 
withdrawal of state support in South Africa put pressure on organisations to be dynamic. 
However, even dynamic organisations are battling to adapt to new regulations such as the 
new Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005) that limit cooperatives to adopt modern cooperatives 
model. Secondly, an amendment to the Petroleum Products Amendment Act has seen most 
agribusinesses denied PPAA licensing even though, acquiring such licensing is a response to 
the changing environment.  
 
4.2.2.1 Organisational culture, strategy and structure 
Organisational culture is defined as the shared beliefs and values that shape the attitudes of 
members, guides behaviours at work and influences the behaviour, performance goals and 
aspirations of members (Schermerhorn et al, 2005). Establishing the correct and appropriate 
organisational culture is an essential process of managing an organization. Organisations with 
strong culture operate with a clear vision of the future that is supported by well developed 
and well communicated beliefs and values. According to Schermerhorn et al (2005) high 
performance organisations have value driven cultures that emphasise the following values; 
information sharing, teamwork, empowerment, participation and continuous learning. 
Schermerhorn et al (2005) based on an approach for mapping organisational culture, 
categorise organisational cultures into three categories; (i) passive/defensive cultures, (ii) 
constructive cultures and (iii) aggressive/defensive cultures as shown in Figure 3. In 
constructive cultures members are encouraged to work together in ways that meet higher 
order human needs. This has been found to be the most effective culture because workers 
tend to work with greater motivation, satisfaction, teamwork and performance. In 
passive/defensive cultures, members tend to act defensively in their working relationships, 
seeking to protect their security. In aggressive/defensive cultures, members tend to act 
forcefully in their working relationships to protect their status. In passive/defensive or 
aggressive/defensive cultures motivation tends to be lower and work attitudes less positive, 
thus resulting in poor or reduced performance.  
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Figure 3: Different organisational cultures 
MORE EFFECTIVE 
 
 
PASSIVE/DEFENSIVE 
CULTURES 
Members are defensive in 
their actions 
 Approval 
 Conventional 
 Dependant 
 Avoidance 
CONSTRUCTIVE 
CULTURES 
Members are helpful in 
their interactions 
 Achievement 
 Self actualising 
 Humanistic encouraging 
 affiliative 
 
AGGRESSIVE/DEFENSIVE 
CULTURES 
Members are forceful in their 
interactions 
 Oppositional 
 Power 
 Competitive 
 perfectionist 
 
 
 
         LESS EFFECTIVE      LESS EFFECTIVE 
Source: Schermerhorn et al (2005). 
 
Schermerhorn et al (2005) argue that because we are not born with a culture but we are born 
into a society that teaches us culture, there is a strong need for organisations to build cultural 
intelligence amongst its workers. That is encouraging an environment where members 
indentify, understand and act sensitively and effectively to the culture of the organisation. 
Although, much of this can be affected by individual personal factors such as family, race 
and religion, organisational culture can be nurtured in an organisation. People learn to 
perform certain behaviours through either the rewards or negative consequences that follow 
their behaviour. When behaviour is rewarded, it is repeated and eventually becomes part of 
the culture.   
 
The structure of the business model also affects organisational dynamism. Ownership issues 
and how the business is organised clearly indicate how dynamic an organisation is. Li and 
Simerly (1998) found that, in dynamic environments, high performing firms tend to be 
managed by individuals holding an ownership stake in their company. This is mainly because 
ownership unifies top management to work together towards a common goal. Management 
without an ownership stake is more likely to be fragmented by individual agendas. 
Ownership and control rights are discussed in more detail in chapter five.  
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In the ever changing business environment, organisational strategies should reflect and 
highlight the unique circumstances that will affect the firm‘s future. Questions that arise 
about the organisations` strategy include, (i) the firms‘ role and level of participation in 
corporate social investment, (ii) the nature of environmental sustainability or eco sensitive 
initiatives, (iii) nature of investments, (iv) the restructuring actions it has or is considering 
undertaking, (v) the BEE score, (vi) accounting reporting method, (vii) changes in customers, 
(viii) changes in product mix or services and value addition? These questions define how an 
organisation will differentiate itself from its competitors and how well they are adapting to 
the dynamic environment (Kyriakopoulos et al, 2004).. In addition, these issues are and will 
continually shape how businesses in South Africa build competitive advantage through their 
strategies.  
 
Rowe (2005) states that four hundred years earlier, social responsibility shifted from the 
church to the state, as government replaced religious institutions as society‘s predominant 
force. The current trend and expected future trend is that business organisations are more than 
likely to take over this responsibility. Various arguments and criticisms have been raised 
against corporate social responsibility (Friedman (1970); Orlitzky et al (2003); Rowe (2005); 
Williams & Aguilera (Undated)). The biggest question being whether business can meet 
social, environmental and responsibility still win financially. However, Porter and Kramer 
(2006) present a strong argument that when looked at strategically, corporate social 
responsibility can become a source of tremendous social progress as the business applies its 
considerable resources, expertise and insights to activities that benefit society because 
successful organisations need a healthy society. Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that dynamic 
organisations prioritise social responsibility into generic social issues, value chain social 
impacts and social dimensions of competitive context
2
. 
 
4.2.2.2 Management style and culture  
It is widely acknowledged that it's important for a company to have a good management team 
because it is the backbone of any successful organisation. The main importance of 
management emanates from its responsibilities to make strategic decisions and leading the 
                                                 
2
 Generic social issues may be important to society but are neither significantly affected by the company‘s 
operations nor influence the company‘s long term competitiveness. Value chain social impacts are those that are 
significantly affected by the company‘s activities in the ordinary course of business. Social dimensions of 
competitive context are factors in the external environment that significantly affect the underlying drivers of 
competitiveness in those places where the company operates.  
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company. However, evaluating management is difficult because so many aspects of the 
management job are intangible. Hambrick and Mason (1984) state that there is no magic 
formula for evaluating management, but there are factors to pay attention to. Management 
culture and style, management competence or ability and management incentives are 
discussed in this study as they relate strongly to management performance and ultimately 
organisational performance. 
 
Management styles can best be explained by the way management manages relationships 
with other stakeholders and the manner management leads the company (Sashkin & Morris, 
1984). According to Benfari and Knox (1991), differences in management styles occur in 
four critical areas, (i) How managers perceive and judge the world around them (ii) how 
managers gain a sense of personal satisfaction and competence (iii) how managers handle 
conflict, and (iv) how managers use power. As a result, there are various ways to describe 
management styles. Autocratic management styles describe management that typically tends 
to centralise authority, dictate work methods, make unilateral decisions and limit subordinate 
participation. Democratic management styles describes management that tends to involve 
subordinates in decision making, delegates authority and use feedback as an opportunity for 
coaching subordinates. The lassez faire management styles generally give the group complete 
freedom to make decisions and complete the work in whatever way it sees fit (Robbins & 
Coulter, 1996).  
 
Management styles may also be determined by the characteristic of management. For 
example a quiet or behind-the-scenes management style, out-front, take-charge type, a formal 
as opposed to an informal relaxed style. Transactional management style is focused on 
motivating the behaviour of subordinates through exchange processes, such as administering 
rewards and punishments. In doing so, transactional management style capitalizes on the self-
interests and extrinsic motives of their employees. On the other hand, transformational 
management style is focused on motivating followers by appealing to their ideals and 
intrinsic motives. Transformational management style inspires others to adopt the vision of 
the organization as though it were their own and to focus their energy towards the 
accomplishment of higher level goals, rather than the attainment of rewards or avoidance of 
punishments (Sashkin & Morris, 1984).  
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Management style should be adapted to suit the generation of employees at the workplace. 
Conger (1997) indicates that there are three generations working in today‘s organisation, the 
silent generation, baby boomer generation and the generation X. These generation shifts play 
a significant role in shaping how employees of the organisation prefer to be managed. In 
today‘s working environment, clearly a more informal, team and persuasion based 
management style will succeed with the baby boomers and generation X as opposed to the 
formal style with a clear distinction between management and employees that worked well 
with the silent generation (Conger, 1997).  
 
Management styles can be translated to the management culture of the organisation. If the 
management culture is not hierarchical, the line of command between the boss and the 
employees is short, and in principle everyone, regardless of education, position or social 
status is regarded as equal (Christine, 2006). Thus management listens to its staff and is 
willing to take advice because they see them as specialists in their own fields. It is common to 
find management taking lunch with the staff and standing in the same queue in the canteen. 
The opposite is true for a company with a hierarchical management culture where there is 
clear distinction between management and other staff.  
 
4.2.2.3 Management competence or ability 
According to Mann (1965) there are four managerial skills that are essential for management 
to carry out their duties well. Technical skills which are needed to perform specific tasks; 
interpersonal skills which are needed to effectively manage interpersonal relations; 
administrative skills which are needed to plan, organises, coordinate and effectively do duties 
that are assumed to be managers normal responsibilities and institutional skills which are 
required if the manager is to effectively represent the organisation to other organisations and 
to society at large. These are discussed in more detail in Table 3. However, different 
managerial positions require different degrees of each of the basic four skills. At the 
executive level, institutional skills, interpersonal skills and administrative skills are by far the 
most important. Whereas at mid management level, a balance of the four skills is important 
although with much emphasis on the interpersonal skills and administrative skills. At a 
supervisory level, technical skills, interpersonal skills and administrative skills are crucial. 
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Table 3: Mann’s four skills 
TECHNICAL SKILLS 
The ability to use knowledge, methods, techniques, and equipment 
necessary for the performance of specific tasks and activities. These 
may be acquired through formal training in professional skills, 
informal on job training or combination of school and 
apprenticeship programmes 
 
HUMAN RELATIONS/INTERPERSONAL SKILLS 
The ability to use pertinent knowledge and methods for working 
with people. Includes an understanding of general principles of 
human behaviour, particularly those that involve interpersonal 
relations and motivation, and the use of this understanding in day to 
day interaction with others in the work situation. The supervisor 
with human relations skills understands how the principles of 
behaviour affect not only others but himself too. He knows hoe both 
his own frame of reference and that of others colour what is 
perceived and assumed in reality; how attitudes, beliefs, opinions 
and values affect behaviour and learning, and how needs and 
aspirations shape an individual‘s investment of his energies. 
Included in these skills is the ability of members at different levels 
in the organisation to represent their needs and goals to each other 
so that each can comprehend the problems faced by the other. 
Central to human relations skills is the ability of the supervisor to 
integrate the goals of individual with the objectives of the 
organisation. The supervisor must be able to identify the needs of 
others that are central to the self concept and to relate these to 
organisational objectives in a manner that is psychologically 
meaningful and rewarding to the specific individual. Basically, this 
area of skills involves managing the emotional and motivational 
dimensions of interpersonal relations and organisation. 
ADMINISTRATIVE SKILLS 
The ability of the manager to think and act in terms of the 
organisation within which he operates; the functions and tasks that 
he must fulfil in order to effectively perform his job relates to the 
tasks and goals of the organisation. Administrative skills include 
planning, organizing, assigning the right tasks to the right people, 
giving people the right amount of responsibility and authority, 
inspecting and following up on work, and coordinating the efforts 
and activities of different organisation members and departments 
INSTITUTIONAL SKILLS 
This set of skills involves representing the organisation as a whole in 
interaction with the other organisation, groups, government agencies, 
and so on, that form the environment of the organisation. People 
differ in their ability to see, think clearly about, appraise, predict and 
understand the demands and opportunities posed to the organisation 
by its environment. If a leader is seriously mistaken about the 
requirements or needs of the organisation, or about the demands of 
the environment, his interpersonal and administrative skills may 
become liabilities to the organisation. It is worse to be wrong and 
influential than to be merely wrong. It is the top level executive who 
needs these institutional skills the most. Part of this category of skills 
is an external perspective- an accurate and comprehensive view of 
the organisation environment relationship – which includes 
sensitivity to environment demands and opportunities (the 
possibilities of achieving a more advantageous relationship with the 
environment) and sensitivity to trends and changes in the 
environment. 
Source: Mann (1965) in Sashkin and Morris (1984). 
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that heterogeneous top management teams perform best 
in dynamic environments, whereas homogeneous teams perform best in more stable 
environments. Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that diverse teams are more capable of 
making sense of ambiguous situations than are less diverse teams, which are likely to operate 
with a more narrow perspective. Priem (1990) also shows that the level of consensus within 
top management teams will likely relate to performance such that low consensus teams will 
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perform best in dynamic environments, whereas high consensus teams will perform best in 
stable environments. In support of these complimentary views, a study by Homburg et al 
(1999) found that top management team consensus tends to have a lower impact on 
performance in dynamic rather than stable environments. 
 
4.2.2.4 Management incentives 
Business organisations use various management incentives to enhance performance 
(Demsetz, 1983). The most commonly used management incentives are mainly the (i) share 
option, (ii) profit share, (iii) incentive bonus and (iv) honorary rewards or non financial 
recognition. Share options have long been used as an incentive to ensuring that management 
increases shareholder value. Demsetz (1983) indicates that when management owns a 
measurable proportion of its shares, it serves as good enough incentives for high performance 
and better management as they are not only managing the owners interest but their own as 
well. Demsetz (1983) argues that share options are a good incentive for management not to 
shirk. In addition, when management have share options, it is much easier to read their 
actions concerning the value of shares and future expectations. However, there are cases or 
dangers for management to do whatever it takes to drive up the share price so they could vest 
their options to make quick returns at the expense of long-term investors.  
 
Profit shares guarantee management a certain specific portion of profits if the company 
performs well. Thus profit shares serve as a performance incentive because if the company is 
performing well then management also gets a good share of the profit. However, profit shares 
also suffer from the same weakness of management driving to increase high profits even if it 
means incurring high debts that could affect the company in the long run. Incentive bonuses 
are also another form of financial compensation management gets for good performance. 
Other companies use non financial recognition such as honorary rewards as management 
incentives to encourage performance. Though not financial in nature and argued not to offer 
incentive enough to encourage performance, these non financial recognitions can encourage 
performance especially if they are highly valued in the organisation for other opportunities 
such as promotion. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 Financial performance is fundamental to the success and sustainability of any 
business 
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 Benchmarking is important to provide goals for realistic improvement and help the 
business to understand the changes required for improving financial performance 
 The study uses external benchmarking as calculated by the 2006 PWC agribusiness 
benchmarking survey. 
 Organisational dynamism refers to the ability for organisations to respond to the 
unpredictable and rapidly changing business environment.  
 There are various factors that affect organisation dynamism, however, four main 
factors are discussed in this chapter, which are management styles and culture, 
management competence, organisation culture and strategies 
 Establishing the correct and appropriate organisation culture is an essential process of 
managing an organization 
 Organisational cultures are categorised into three; (i) passive/defensive cultures, (ii) 
constructive cultures and (iii) aggressive/defensive cultures. In constructive cultures 
members are encouraged to work together in ways that meet higher order human 
needs. This has been found to be the most effective culture because workers tend to 
work with greater motivation, satisfaction, teamwork and performance 
 A strong management is the backbone of any successful company and thus it is 
widely acknowledged that it's important for a company to have a good management 
team 
 Management styles are important to business because they are linked to the success of 
the business and in other cases can be translated to the management culture of the 
organisation. 
 Management incentives and compensation ((i) share option, (ii) profit share, (iii) 
incentive bonus and (iv) honorary rewards or non financial recognition) has been 
shown to have a strong link with performance and thus organisation performance 
 Conclusively, organisational dynamism and organisational culture as well as 
management competence, ability, culture, style and incentives can explain why some 
businesses organisations perform better than others.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The main objective of the chapter is to provide an understanding of organisational 
restructuring and provide insight of the cooperative business model and its differences to 
other business models mainly the investor oriented company. The property rights approach is 
mainly concerned with how the assignment of and costs of transferring property rights affect 
incentives and economic outcomes (Furubotn & Richter, 2000). Furubotn and Richter (2000) 
state that the structure of property rights is important because it affects transaction costs, 
incentives and economic behaviour. Blair (1995), Demsetz (1988), Demsetz (1997), and 
Chaddad and Cook (2004) show the importance of well defined and enforced property rights 
for the success of business. Property rights are important because they influence incentives, 
affects stakeholder behaviour and thus economic outcomes of businesses.  
 
Organisational structures with well clearly defined property rights are argued to do better 
than organisational structures with ill defined property rights (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). 
Demsetz (1967) proposes that market forces push economic organisations in the direction of 
efficiency by eliminating inefficient property right structures and promoting the introduction 
of new arrangements that are better adapted to the economic challenges and opportunities. 
However, Sugden (1989) argues that property rights have emerged over time by convention 
(or through the operation of the invisible hand) and that the structures that have evolved need 
not be efficient. Demsetz (1988) shows that the efficiency of the firm is argued to depend on 
how well its members (including those who supply inputs or are within the enterprise) are 
able to blend their efforts and cooperate effectively. Thus the key issue for organisational 
economics is to determine how to motivate individuals so that they will work towards 
collective interests and make the firm successful through well defined and properly assigned 
property rights (Demsetz (1988) and Demsetz (1997)).  
 
5.2 Background on the property rights framework 
5.2.1 Ownership rights 
Furubotn and Richter (2000) state that when there is uncertainty and asymmetrical 
information, ownership of resources matter for economic results. Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) define ownership as the possession of the (i) rights to be a residual claimant, (ii) rights 
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to observe input behaviour (iii) rights to be the central party common to all contracts with 
inputs (iv) rights to alter the membership of the team, and (v) the rights to sell these rights as 
desired. Ownership rights are argued to affect economic incentives and behaviour which 
affects the economic performance of the firm (Demsetz, 1988). It is important that ownership 
rights should be able to assign the costs or benefits associated with any individuals‘ actions or 
behaviour on that individual. Well defined ownership rights should take into account the 
costs an individual can cause by attempting to maximise or minimise the present value of 
benefits or costs respectively, at the expense of the organisations future or other individuals. 
When the full costs or benefits of an individual‘s activity are borne to him, this creates an 
incentive to utilise resources more efficiently and results in efficient maximising decisions. 
 
The critical questions ownership rights have to address are (i) who owns the firm? (ii) what 
does ownership of a firm mean? (iii) does it matter whether the firm is owned by those who 
invested capital in it, by its workers or by the state? These issues are critical because the 
identity of owners, the content of the bundle of ownership rights and the structure of 
ownership has consequences on decisions made and hence the outcome or efficiency of the 
firm (Demsetz, 1988). Ownership rights in firms tend to be described by the way shares 
entitle the rights to the holders. Thus different firms can differ in the way shareholder rights 
are allocated as shown by how claims are made to the firms income, dividends entitlement, 
what is expected of shareholders and the rights to transfer such ownership. 
 
Demsetz (1988) indicates that the costs of negotiating and monitoring ownership rights 
increases with number of owners. Even though a large number of owners can be justified by 
the benefits to economies of scale and the equity capital that can be raised from these 
shareholders, Demsetz (1988) argues that economies of scale in the provision of capital do 
not exist. In addition, if all owners participate in decision making, negotiating costs become 
high. As a result, when the scale of ownership rises, there is a growing need to employ 
management to make decisions on some aspects of the business. In principle, ownership 
means effective control, but when the organisation grows some control rights are allocated to 
management.  
 
5.2.2 Control rights 
Control rights refer to the ability and extent to exercise influence within an organization by 
making crucial decisions affecting the organization or relevant to its functioning (Demsetz, 
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1988). Demsetz (1997) states that control is not limited to the power and incentives of 
decision making but also to the wealth gain achievable through effective monitoring of 
managerial performance by the firms owners. 
 
Control rights will differ depending on the organisational structure of the firm e.g. control 
rights are different for cooperatives, public owned, private owned, state owned organisations. 
In most organisational structures, shareholders own the firm and their ownership and 
shareholding comes with specified control rights. Individual shareholders or owners have 
control rights through their voting power in matters pertaining to the appointment of the 
board of directors and approving proposals for fundamental changes affecting the firm such 
as liquidations, mergers, acquisitions e.t.c. Depending on the firms structure of control rights 
or business model, the voting power can be based on the number, class or types of shares tied 
to the level of capital invested or in the case of traditional cooperatives, one member one vote 
principle. The importance of voting power is that individuals who possess a majority of 
shares and effectively have more voting power to dictate the firm's decisions, thus effectively 
controlling the firm. Therefore, control rights are important because they determine the 
decisions that the firm makes. Demsetz (1988) presents it as the incentive to control.  
 
When the firm increases in size and scale, shareholders or owners cannot exercise all their 
control rights because the control function and activities grow beyond what an individual can 
handle (Blair, 1995). Thus some control rights are allocated to the board of directors and 
management. The board of directors basically supervises, oversees and controls the 
organisation through management. However, the important issues such as the strategy and 
objectives of the organisation usually remain the duties of the owners to decide or control. 
Because of delegation of duties, some control rights are allocated to management.  
 
5.2.3 Agency problem 
When organisations grow, ownership and control rights are usually separated. However, it 
becomes important to establish an appropriate property rights structure that will minimise the 
conflicts and costs incurred because of the separation of ownership and control by drawing up 
the appropriate incentives such that those granted control rights of the organisation, 
specifically management, serves the best interest of the owners (Blair (1995); Demsetz 
(1988); Demsetz (1997) and Furubotn & Richter, 2000)). The agency theory provides a 
framework to discuss the separation of ownership and control rights.  
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Agency theory assumes that there are two economic actors in each case, the principal and the 
agent. The principal engages the agent to perform services on his behalf. To facilitate the 
achievement of the activity, the principal delegates some decision making authority to the 
agent. Information is taken to be asymmetric in the sense that, (i) the agent‘s action is not 
directly observable by the principal or (ii) the agent has made some observation that the 
principal has not made (e.g. the true output of the firm). Furthermore, it is too costly for the 
principal to directly monitor the agent‘s actions or to acquire full knowledge of the agent‘s 
unique observational information directly. This could lead to moral hazard and 
characteristically, the agent will not act in the best interest of the principal (Furubotn & 
Richter, 2000). Based on such a situation, the agency theory shows the importance of 
appropriately structuring ownership and control rights in a firm.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Furubotn and Richter (2000) indicate that the principal can 
limit the agents` divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the 
agent or alternatively by monitoring the uncharacteristic activities of the agent. In some 
situations, the principal can pay the agent to guarantee that he will not do certain actions 
which would harm the principal or alternatively insure that the principal will be compensated 
if the agent does take such actions (Furubotn & Richter, 2000). Agency costs vary from firm 
to firm as they depend on the tastes of managers (attitudes of agents), the ease with which 
agents exercise their own preferences as opposed to adopting behaviour that results to the 
maximisation of the owners residual, the agents degree of risk aversion, the costs of 
monitoring and bonding activities, as well as the organisational structure of the firm 
(Furubotn & Richter, 2000). Jensen and Meckling (1976) also indicate that agency costs 
depend upon the costs of monitoring the managers‘ performance and evaluating it, as well as 
the cost of devising and enforcing specific behavioural rules or policies.  
 
Manne (1965) explains the concept of the separation of ownership and control by indicating 
that takeover threats represent the most efficient instrument for disciplining management. 
Basically, in a badly run company, the market price of shares would be comparatively low. 
Such a low current price of shares indicates the possibility of a more profitable future for the 
company provided its existing assets were managed more efficiently. Thus the company 
becomes an attractive target for takeover by individuals who believe they could improve its 
performance. Manne (1965) argues that the possibility of takeover threat is sufficient to solve 
the agency problem.  
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Agency problems can be limited by separating the management and control of decisions, thus 
restricting agents from having all the power at their disposal (Furubotn & Richter, 2000). In 
the case when monitors are selected to monitor the agent, there is the dilemma on who will 
monitor the monitor. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that if the monitor possesses the title 
to the market value of the firm and all the gains or losses in the firm‘s market value can be 
assigned to the monitor, then there is no incentive to shirk. As a result, the best solution 
would seem to be to allow the monitor to become the full owner of the firm. Knott (1993) 
states that the market for management also influences the behaviour of managers, if the 
market for management is highly competitive, then incentives for managers to pursue their 
own interest at the expense of the owners are limited.  
 
5.3. Property rights that constrain the growth of cooperatives 
Various studies have been done on the property rights features of cooperatives (Chaddad & 
Cook (2004), Chaddad et al (2005), Cook (1995), Harvey & Sykuta (2005), Hendrikse & 
Veerman. (2001a, b), Ortmann & King (2007a, b), Sykuta & Cook (2001)). These studies 
clearly expose the inherent weaknesses of the cooperative model as a result of the ill defined 
property rights. The weaknesses of cooperative property rights seem to be a direct result of 
their imperative. If viewed as purely social or developmental institutions then the following 
property rights seem justifiable; (i) allowing for everyone to join the cooperative as long as 
they share the same principles and can afford the nominal sum for the equity membership fee, 
(ii) redeeming only the nominal value of the members nominal investment upon exit, (iii) one 
member one vote principle, (iv) restricting external investors to be members. However, once 
cooperatives grow in size and undertake activities in competitive markets that requires the 
cooperative to be highly competitive to survive, then cooperative problems as a result of ill 
defined property rights as described below emerge (Cook (1995); Chaddad & Cook (2004)); 
 Free-rider problem; Emerges when ownership rights are untradeable and not 
sufficiently well defined and enforced to ensure that individuals are responsible for 
the full cost of their actions or receive the full benefits they create. Chaddad and Cook 
(2004) distinguish between external and internal free rider problems. An external free 
rider problem arises when the benefits and costs faced by members and non-members 
are poorly aligned. For example, where a cooperative is successful in shifting the 
market price and terms for the inputs that its owners supply towards competitive 
levels (i.e. in an industry otherwise lacking competition), other non-member suppliers 
may get to enjoy the same price and terms without paying for membership.  
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An internal free rider problem arises when new members of the cooperative enjoy the 
same patronage returns as existing members, or can access the cooperative‘s capital 
without paying the full cost of the benefits they derive. As a result, other cooperative 
members effectively subsidise their entry. This dilution of existing member returns 
creates a conflict between new and old members, and a disincentive for older 
members to invest in the cooperative.  
 Horizon problem; Arises when the owner-patron‘s claim on the cooperative‘s 
residual earnings is short lived when compared to the productive life of the 
cooperative. When benefits a member receives from an investment are limited to the 
period (horizon) over which the member expects to patronize the cooperative because 
his ownership claims cannot be traded at market value, cooperatives will tend to 
under-invest in assets with long-term payoffs such as research and development, and 
marketing (Harte, 1997).  
 Portfolio problem; Occurs because member shares cannot be freely traded and the 
inability of owner-patrons to separate their ownership and patronage decisions. 
Therefore, members are unable to adjust their individual investment portfolios 
according to their personal wealth and preferences for risk, which could result in 
suboptimal investment portfolios. Faced with suboptimal investment portfolios, 
members will attempt to direct the activities of the cooperative in a direction that 
better matches their own risk-return trade off. This in turn means cooperatives face 
pressure from their owner-patrons to adopt investment policies that mitigate this 
owner-level lack of diversification, even when this is not optimal for the cooperative. 
In addition, potential outside investors, who could diversify the risks, are generally 
excluded from investing in a cooperative. 
 Control problem; Any organization in which ownership and control are separate, 
will to some extent experience principal-agent problems due to divergence of interests 
between the principal and the agent. Because of this separation it is predicted that the 
interests of owners and managers will diverge, giving rise to agency costs. The 
absence of an equity market and lack of transferable ownership claims or shares with 
an observable current market value for cooperatives means that members are not able 
to monitor their cooperative‘s value or evaluate managers‘ performance resulting in 
operational inefficiencies being unnoticed. Such control problems are argued to 
worsen with cooperative size and complexity. 
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 Influence cost problem; The dual role of the member as owner and user could create 
a situation in which some members attempt to influence the cooperatives` decisions 
for personal benefits ignoring the costs of such poor decisions to the cooperative. 
Cooperatives may experience greater influence costs than other forms of organisations 
because the interests of cooperative members, who are linked to individual farm 
production activities, are more diverse than the interests of corporate shareholder who 
share a common objective of maximizing return on investments (Royer, 1999). The 
influence cost problem is further worsened if the cooperative‘s range of activities is 
wider or if there is great heterogeneity among its members giving incentives for 
interest groups to form and seek to influence the cooperative‘s decisions to their 
benefit even if it is at the expense of other members. Banerjee et al (2001) present 
evidence on the costs of such behaviour in Indian sugar processing cooperatives, 
where larger owners face an incentive to reduce the price paid on inputs, to the 
detriment of smaller suppliers, in order to increase their personal prestige. 
 
5.4 Evolution of new cooperative models 
The inherent weaknesses of traditional cooperatives have led to the evolution of new 
cooperative models in cases where policies and legislation have allowed such actions. 
Chaddad and Cook (2004) present a classification of cooperative models based on an 
ownership typology, in which traditional cooperatives and investor-oriented cooperatives are 
polar forms.  
 
5.4.1. Proportional Investment Co-operatives (PICs) 
Proportional investment co-operatives require cooperative members to contribute equity 
capital in proportion to usage through either one of the three main cooperative policies, the (i) 
base capital plans, (ii) narrowing product scopes and (iii) capital acquisitions on business unit 
basis. The base capital plan illustrates the simplest way in which the PICs operate. With the 
base capital plan, the cooperatives` capital requirements are determined first, based on future 
investment opportunities and members‘ willingness to supply risk capital. Secondly, 
proportional member usage is then determined by measuring the members‘ average usage 
over a base period and calculating the members minimum equity capital requirements based 
on relative patronage. With time, it is expected that some members could become over-
invested and others under invested. Thus, it is important to design a plan to increase equity 
investment of under-invested members and redeem part of the equity for over-invested 
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members (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). By allowing equity to transfer between over- and under-
invested members, the internal free-rider problem is eliminated. However, the following 
weaknesses still exist; 
 shares in a PIC cannot be traded (portfolio problem) at their market value (horizon 
and control problems) 
 Voting rights are egalitarian (influence problem). 
 PICs are complex to administer and oblige rather than encourage investment. 
 
5.4.2. Member-investor Co-operatives (MICs) 
Member-investor co-operatives give restricted voting, non transferable and redeemable 
ownership rights to member patrons but also allows other investors and member patrons to 
have non-voting shares that entitles them to the distribution of net earnings in proportion to 
member shareholdings rather than patronage. As a result, MICs separates patronage and 
investment thus allowing a substantial share of co-operative profits to accrue to member-
investors rather than to member-patrons only. The MICs model can be implemented by 
means of either participation units, capital units or redeemable preference shares as evidenced 
in countries such as Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia  
 
Participation units are non-transferable, redeemable, nonvoting and appreciable ownership 
rights. The board sets the value of participation units that will be issued for member patrons 
or member investors. Capital units enable cooperatives to raise additional risk capital and to 
provide investment returns to members. Capital units entitle the holder to an interest in the 
capital, but not in the members‘ share capital of the co-operative. Capital units are 
transferable, appreciate in value so that capital gains can be realised when the shares are 
redeemed. Redeemable preference shares are non-transferable, interest bearing, appreciable, 
non-voting and have redeemable ownership rights. These different types of shares fully 
address the free rider problem, however the following weaknesses still exist; 
 The portfolio, horizon and control problems is not fully addressed because the 
tradability of these shares is reduced by uncertainty about capital gains since shares 
are redeemed at a price approved by the democratically elected board of directors not 
the market. 
 The influence problem remains because shares held in a MIC do not grant voting 
rights in the co-operative 
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5.4.3. New generation co-operatives (NGCs) 
New generation co-operatives (NGCs) were formed and quickly gained popularity in the US 
agricultural sector in the 1990s and in other countries including New Zealand. NGCs 
introduce the concept of well-defined property rights in the form of delivery rights (Cook, 
1995). Delivery contracts set out members‘ rights and obligations to deliver products of a 
specified quality and quantity. Members must pay for any shortfalls on contacted delivery 
amounts or quality.  
 
Member producers make sizeable capital investments to fund value-added processing 
facilities, with shares being linked to units of production. Member equity usually makes up 
40 – 50% of capital, with the balance financed externally (Cook, 1995). Membership is 
closed, with shares tradable among members at share values that vary with the cooperative‘s 
prospects. New shares are sold if equity is required for expansion or in proportion to delivery 
volumes where equity is required for other purposes. Profits are distributed as patronage 
refunds, but since patronage and investment are proportional, this amounts to proportional 
dividends on invested capital. Non-voting securities can be sold to non-members also. New 
members have to purchase delivery rights from existing owners at their market price, thus 
enabling member-investors to realise capital gains.  
 
Alignment of investment with capital gains and patronage returns addresses the internal free-
rider problem. NGCs apply the one-member-one-vote principle, despite investments being 
proportional to patronage. Heterogeneity among members is reduced by NGCs operating in 
narrow business fields as compared to other agricultural cooperatives that often diversify. 
Directors are chosen from among members. NGCs resolve common traditional cooperative 
problems as follows; 
 Horizon problems – removed by tradable shares 
 Free-riding problems – are reduced since value of unallocated capital is reflected in 
tradable share prices, and investment/patronage signals are not distorted by artificially 
setting equity values as in traditional cooperatives; 
 Portfolio problems – are minimal because NGCs‘ narrow business focus reduces 
conflicts over investment policy, members are fairly homogeneous and projects are 
thoroughly scrutinised before establishment. 
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However, the following weaknesses exist; 
 Delivery rights do not fully address the horizon and control problems because 
members‘ shares remain non-tradable and therefore do not internalise or signal 
growth in NGC net worth when the proceeds of delivery rights issues are invested in 
growth assets.  
 The competitiveness of the delivery rights market is questionable. 
 Delivery rights have no effect on voting rights and therefore do not address the 
influence problem.  
 
5.4.4 Cooperatives with capital seeking entities 
This model addresses the restriction of cooperative ownership rights being restricted to 
member patrons by acquiring outside capital using a separate legal entity such as a strategic 
alliance, a trust company or a publicly held subsidiary. In the USA, some cooperatives form 
strategic alliances with another partner to acquire external risk equity capital. The deal could 
entitle the alliance to a share of profits or being a long-term supplier of inputs or expertise. As 
is the case with the Dairy farmers of America whose deal with a strategic alliance entitles the 
alliance to be the long-term preferred supplier in exchange of investing, marketing and 
processing the cooperative farmers‘ products. Alternatively, the cooperative can establish a 
non-operative entity, a trust company solely for acquiring risk capital from non-member 
sources, as is the case with Diamond cooperative owned by walnut growers in California, 
which established the Diamond Walnut Capital Trust. Finally, the cooperative could establish 
and transfer all its assets to a separate public limited company in order to receive risk capital 
from outside investors with new equity shares in the subsidiary company. This model has 
been used by Kerry Cooperative Creameries Ltd in Ireland, France by the cooperative bank 
Credit Agricole as well as in the USA by Gold Kisk, Agrilink  and O`Lakes. However, the 
model has the following weaknesses; 
 New organisational costs such as agency, collective decision making and influence 
costs are incurred. A cost benefit analysis is important to decide whether the model is 
beneficial or just an addition of costs. 
 Control and horizon problems are still not fully addressed 
 
5.4.5. Investor-share co-operatives (ISCs) 
Neither the PICs nor NGCs accommodate equity and investment by non-members as they are 
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restricted to member-patrons with the possible exception of MICs and cooperatives with 
capital seeking entities. ISCs acquire non member equity capital without converting to 
investor oriented firms by issuing separate classes of equity in addition to the traditional 
ownership rights held by patrons mainly preferred stock, non-voting common stock and 
participation certificates. Preferred stock is a non-voting, fixed dividend, non-redeemable 
ownership right. These have been issued in the USA by a Denver based cooperative bank, 
Cobank specialising in financial services for agribusiness and rural utilities. Non-voting 
common stock are a separate bundle of stock from the cooperative patron member non-
transferable, non-appreciable and voting shares.  
 
Investor-share co-operatives afford the cooperative an opportunity to raise permanent risk 
capital while maintaining member control. Thus, ISCs effectively publicly lists non-voting 
stock while maintaining voting stock in the hands of the cooperative members. ISCs are 
common among agricultural cooperatives in Australia (e.g. Australian Agric Co, AWB Ltd), 
Canada (Saskatchewan Wheat Pool even trades in the Toronto Stock Exchange). With 
participation certificates, outside investors may become members and invest in the 
cooperative. Farmer controlled businesses found in the UK exhibit the same model because 
farmers hold both control and the majority of shares with the primary goal of serving the 
economic interest of farmers. In summary, these shares alleviate the control problem, free 
rider, horizon and the portfolio problems. However, the following weaknesses exist; 
 ISCs are argued to dilute the co-operative principles and thus may not qualify for all 
of the benefits and support afforded to conventional co-operatives e.g. South Africa‘s 
new Co-operatives Act does not allow development-oriented co-operatives to raise 
capital and expertise by taking on external equity partners 
 
5.5. Alternative organisational changes  
Hudson and Herndon (2000) state that successful cooperatives are far more likely to expand 
operations, merge with other cooperatives, or even to acquire companies before converting. 
The following section discusses some of the alternatives. 
 
5.5.1 Mergers 
A relatively large number of mergers have occurred in South African agribusinesses as is 
reported among U.S. agricultural cooperatives over the last ten years (Competition 
Commission (2004), Hudson & Herndon (2000) and Henehan (2002)). A merger is a 
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combination of two or more companies into one larger company through either a stock swap 
or cash payment to the target company (Hudson and Herndon, 2002). Mergers usually result 
in a new company name. Various classifications of mergers (Wikipedia, 2008); 
 Horizontal mergers take place when the two merging companies produce similar 
product in the same industry.  
 Vertical mergers occur when two firms, each working at different stages in the 
production of the same good, combine.  
 Conglomerate mergers take place when the two firms operate in different industries. 
 Reverse merger is used as a way of going public without the expense and time 
required by a public corporation. 
 Accretive mergers are those in which a company with a high price to earnings ratio 
(P/E) acquires one with a low P/E. 
 Dilutive mergers are the opposite of above, whereby a company with a low P/E 
acquires one with a high P/E. 
 
There are various reasons companies take part in mergers. However, in the end, mergers are 
usually directed to be beneficial to both parties taking part in the merger (Hudson & Herndon 
(2000) and Henehan (2002)). The underlying reasons for the failure of mergers have been 
shown to include the following among many reasons (Moeller, 2003);  
 Incompatibility—whether of technology, equipment, or corporate culture. 
 Inadequate research or by concealment of losses or liabilities by one of the partners.  
 Overlapping subsidiaries or redundant staff may be allowed to continue creating 
inefficiency. 
 New management may cut too many operations or personnel, losing expertise and 
disrupting employee culture.  
 
Henehan (2002) indicates that several mergers have resulted in the formation of the largest 
dairy cooperatives in the U.S. Such is the case with some mergers that have occurred in South 
African agriculture (Competition commission, 2000). Due to such results, mergers are always 
viewed with much scepticism mainly because of concerns that they usually result in unfair or 
anti competitive behaviour such as the creation of monopolies or restriction of trade 
(Heykoop, 2003). Thus mergers have come under heavy analysis and regulation in most 
countries.  
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5.5.2 Acquisitions and takeovers 
Acquisition and takeovers involve the buying of one company, the target company by another 
company (Hudson & Herndon, 2002). In most cases, target companies are usually smaller 
firms than the firm buying. Under normal circumstances, acquisitions are done in good spirit, 
with both companies cooperating and willing to take part in the acquisition deal. However, 
there are certain circumstances when the target company is unwilling to be bought or the 
target's board has no prior knowledge of the offer, this is usually referred to as hostile 
takeovers (Foltz, 2002). There are various types of acquisitions, chief of which are (Foltz, 
(2002) and Hudson & Herndon (2002));  
 The buyer buys the shares, and therefore control of the target company being 
purchased. Ownership of the company in turn conveys effective control over the 
assets of the company, but since the company is acquired intact as a going business, 
this form of transaction carries with it all of the liabilities accrued by that business 
over its past and all of the risks that company faces in its commercial environment.  
 The buyer buys the assets of the target company. The cash the target receives from the 
sell-off is paid back to its shareholders by dividend or through liquidation. This type 
of transaction leaves the target company as an empty shell, if the buyer buys out the 
entire assets. A buyer often structures the transaction as an asset purchase to pick the 
assets that it wants and leave out the assets and liabilities that it does not.  
 Reverse takeover; Sometimes, however, a smaller firm will acquire management 
control of a larger or longer established company and keep its name for the combined 
entity. 
 
5.5.3 Integration 
Integration refers to the reorganisation of firms by either moving up the supply or value 
chain, or down the supply value chain. There are various motivations for integration but firms 
mainly use integration to increase their market shares, improve efficiency, build market 
power or to enter other new markets (Gregor (2003). There are basically three forms of 
integration, horizontal, vertical and backward integration. 
 Horizontal integration; relates to the expansion of a firm at the same level in the 
value chain. The Competition Commission (2004) illustrates that a relatively large 
amount of horizontal integration has taken place in the maize supply chain. Some 
examples include OTK Agri/Farm Feed services, Afgri/Laeveld Korporatiewe 
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Beleggings, Afrigrain (Pty) Ltd/Unigrain Cape (Pty) Ltd, Afgri operations/Natal 
Agricultural Co-operative, Kaap Agri/ NLK e.t.c. 
 Vertical integration; describes a situation where a firm has its interests diversified 
into related activities. It is basically a linkage between producers and distributors to 
final consumers. An example of vertically integrated companies in the South African 
maize market are the dominant silo companies (Mc Gregor, 2002). Examples in South 
Africa include Afgri/Nedan Oil Mills, Synapp international/Senwesko Voere, 
Rainbow Farms/Vector Logistics (Pty) Ltd, Afgri/Daybreak 
 Backward integration into the production of inputs ensures stable supplies and 
reduces the cost of coordinating activities at different stages of production. This puts 
potential new entrants at a cost disadvantage and increases their sunk costs. 
 
5.5.4 Joint ventures 
A joint venture is an entity formed between two or more companies by combining their assets 
for a specific business purpose or to undertake economic activity together (Hudson and 
Herndon, 2002). The companies agree to create a new entity by both contributing equity, and 
they then share in the revenues, expenses, and control of the enterprise. Francois et al (2002) 
argue that unlike a merger, a joint venture typically involves only temporary, partial, and 
small activities. Thus the parent companies are still free to continue their activities separately. 
The idea is that in case a joint venture fails, the parent firms would be less affected.  
 
5.6 The decision to convert  
5.6.1 Various hypotheses 
Schrader (1989) proposed that the nature of a patron's equity in terms of the method the 
cooperative uses to liquidate a member's equity results in cooperatives restructuring as 
investor-oriented firms, especially successful cooperatives. When cooperative members 
liquidate their equity and receive no more than its accounting book value, there is an 
economic motive for members to approve a sale or corporate reorganization such as 
converting to a company when the market value of the members' equity exceeds book value. 
Schrader (1989) states that if there is growth in the market value of assets due to inflation or 
other market forces, the liquidating value of a member's equity will eventually exceed its 
book value. Thus a sale or corporate reorganization of the cooperative will produce more 
value for members than liquidating their individual positions. Alternatively, Collins (1991) 
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argues that the limited ability to generate internal equity in a cooperative especially when 
there is an opportunity for a profitable investment opportunity may create a rational choice to 
restructure the cooperative as a publicly held corporation with access to external equity.  
 
The corporate acquisition hypothesis suggests that the motivation for the conversion of 
cooperatives may in some cases come from the corporate sector rather than from the 
cooperative (Collins, 1991a). The corporate acquisition hypothesis suggests that cooperatives 
may have sources of product supply and processing capacity that fit a corporation's plans for 
vertical integration. Alternatively, a corporation may wish to acquire a vertically integrated 
cooperative simply to expand its scale and spread the costs of central management functions. 
In other cases, a corporation may wish to acquire the cooperative's share of a finished product 
market. In addition, (Collins 1991a) argues that corporations may find cooperatives as easy 
prey for takeovers compared to taking over a comparable corporation because of the 
liquidation mechanism of cooperatives. For example, when a majority of the members of a 
cooperative have a short time horizon, the capitalized stream of benefits from cooperative 
membership will be small and any bid by a corporation in excess of the book value will be 
advantageous to these members.  
 
The cost-of equity hypothesis suggests that contrary to the equity access hypothesis, access to 
cheap equity could be the main motivation to conversions. The cooperative could raise equity 
from economically rational members if the return expected by the member exceeded the 
opportunity cost of the funds (Collins (1991a, 1991b)). However, in cases when the income 
of the cooperative is highly correlated with the income of the members, the risk premium 
required by the member may exceed the premium required by a well-diversified external 
investor and external equity may therefore be cheaper to acquire than equity from members 
(Mooney & Gray, 2002). This would occur if the member is poorly diversified and the 
cooperative has low systematic risk for a broadly diversified portfolio. In this case, the equity 
of the cooperative would have high systematic risk for the member but low systematic risk 
for an outside investor, and a powerful incentive would exist for the cooperative to issue 
publicly held stock.  
 
Harte (1995; 1997) based on transaction cost theory argues that efficient governance 
structures can be expected over time to replace inefficient structures in competitive markets. 
Harte (1997 states that as market performance improves and owing to the fact that 
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cooperatives are perceived to be less efficient than corporations, it is expected that there will 
be a transition from the cooperative organisational form to the corporate form. Harte (1997 
argues that cooperatives would be expected to persist indefinitely only in the case of chronic 
market failure. The basis of Harte`s (1997) explanation lies on the assumptions that 
cooperatives are less efficient than corporations and that cooperatives would be expected to 
persist indefinitely only in the case of chronic market failure.  
 
Cook (1995) presents a five stage model of cooperative formation, growth and demise that 
seek to explain why and how cooperatives undertake restructuring activities based on 
transaction, agency costs and the property rights framework. Cook (1995) states that during 
stage one cooperatives are formed in a defensive nature thus creating incentives for collective 
action either when individual producers need institutional mechanisms to bring economic 
balance under their control or when they need institutional mechanisms to countervail 
opportunisms or market failure. During stage two, Cook (1995) indicates that cooperatives 
formed for economic balance or excess supply induced prices are usually short-lived and 
have little economic impact on their members. Whereas cooperatives formed to confront 
market failures survive the infant stage. When other competitors of successful cooperatives 
begin to modify their behaviour or strategies, members in a cooperative become aware of the 
problems intrinsic to the cooperative organisational form (mainly horizon, portfolio, control, 
free rider and influence costs problems) and the benefits that could be lost if the cooperative 
discontinues to operate. Thus the cooperative is faced with three options; (i) exit (ii) continue 
or (iii) transition. Cook (1995) states that under the exit option, the cooperative can either 
liquidate or restructure as an investor owned corporation. As a result, poorly performing 
cooperatives liquidate whereas well performing cooperatives restructure to companies, a 
trend similar to the developments of South African cooperatives (Ortmann & King, 2007a, b). 
Alternatively, the cooperative can continue operating and adopt modern cooperative models 
or take the transition option by converting to new generation cooperatives popular in the USA 
or other modern cooperative models.  
 
5.6.2 Company versus the cooperative business model. 
5.6.2.1 Market orientation 
Kyriakopoulos et al (2004) state that market orientation consists of (i) competitor orientation, 
which includes the activities involved in acquiring information about the competitors in the 
target market and transmitting it throughout the firm, (ii) customer orientation, which 
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includes the activities involved in acquiring information about the customers in the target 
market and disseminating it throughout the firm, and (iii) inter-functional coordination, which 
comprises the firm‘s coordinated efforts, involving more than the marketing department, to 
create superior value for the customers. Kyriakopoulos et al (2004) show strong evidence that 
market orientation is a key strategy that firm‘s adopt to build a long-term competitive 
position because it increases customer satisfaction, customer loyalty and new product 
success. Thus, it is argued that companies, whose key to survival is their competitive 
advantage, tend to be more market oriented than cooperatives (Kyriakopoulos et al, 2004). 
Cooperative principles and their essence are argued to limit the extent to which they can be 
market oriented as compared to a company. However, despite the strong argument of 
companies being more market oriented than cooperatives, Piesse et al (2004) indicate that 
grain cooperatives are also changing from being member oriented to being market oriented 
by gaining market power and adopting market oriented strategies.  
 
5.6.2.2. Ownership 
In a traditional cooperative, ownership is restricted to those who patronise the organisation 
and new members often pay only a nominal sum for the equity. This is different in modern 
cooperative models as discussed in section 5.4 which have adopted innovative ownership 
structures. However, when based on traditional cooperative ownership structures whereby 
equity ownership is tied to a normal membership fee and the distribution of profits is in 
proportion to patronage, the ownership claim of a cooperative shareholder differs in several 
ways from that of a company whose equity ownership is tied to the level of capital invested 
and there is a secondary market for company shares. Such arrangements make company 
shares more attractive and have possibilities of a higher return as compared to cooperative 
shares. This is compounded by the fact that in traditional cooperatives, member‘s shares are 
redeemed at the nominal value of their member nominal investment upon exit. Thus the 
amount paid on such redemption does not reflect the current market value of cooperative 
membership, or the present value of expected future cooperative net cash flows. However, as 
was discussed in section 5.4 some new cooperative models have established an internal 
secondary market for member shares and allowed for appreciable investments or shares. 
 
5.6.2.3. Control 
Democratic control of cooperatives in the form of one member one vote, results in different 
control issues and behaviour of cooperatives when compared to companies whose voting is 
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based on the member‘s shareholding. The one member one vote principle creates no incentive 
for members who may be willing to contribute large capital as that does not imply that they 
influence cooperative decisions in order to protect their investments. As such, it is expected 
that coalition building among members is much more important in the decision making 
process of cooperatives than in that of companies. Thus, cooperatives that delegate greater 
decision making authority to management may be better able to compete with companies, 
albeit at the cost of less direct member involvement in decision making. Usually, cooperative 
boards restrict non members from serving on the board of directors. The advantage to this is 
that because members of the board are users of the cooperatives` services, they may bring to 
the board some of the technical knowledge about the cooperatives services and operations 
that outside directors may lack. If the cooperative's operations are complex or extend far 
beyond the farm, however, it is likely that member directors will lack the expertise in 
marketing, manufacturing, or retailing that external directors could provide.  
 
5.6.2.4 Managerial behaviour 
The lack of a secondary market for cooperative shares denies the cooperative tools for 
influencing managerial behaviour (Suhler & Cook, 1993). Cooperative shareholders have no 
simple indicator like a share price by which they can evaluate how well management has 
enhanced the future earnings capacity of their firm. If they evaluate management primarily on 
the current prices the cooperative charges for its services, the manager may be induced to de-
capitalize the firm in an attempt to increase current earnings, simply reinforcing the horizon 
problem. Fluctuations in the value of company shares therefore serve as an important 
disciplining mechanism on management. Many firms reinforce the strength of this 
disciplining mechanism by offering share options to top management, which makes the 
earnings of these personnel based on the share value. Tying the manager's earnings to the 
firm's performance, as judged by the share market, may thus reduce managerial shirking 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  
 
Staaz (1987) argues that in most cases cooperatives members tend to pressure management to 
adopt more conservative business strategies than those of competing companies because 
investments in cooperatives are largely sunk whereas owners of a company can sell their 
shares and quit the organisation if they believe the investment is not worth it. Furthermore, 
because of the immobility of cooperative capital, it is more difficult for cooperatives than for 
companies to spread their risks by diversifying into totally unrelated activities. Finally, 
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Kyriakopoulos et al (2004) indicates that cooperative managers, particularly those of large, 
diversified cooperatives may spend more time on member relations, thus putting cooperatives 
at a competitive disadvantage because their chief executive officers have less time than 
company managers for strategic planning and administration. 
 
5.6.2.5 Scope for optimization 
Staaz (1987) states that the scope for optimization in a cooperative is potentially broader than 
in a competing company that is not vertically integrated into farming. This is because a 
profit-maximizing farmer-member would be interested not in running the farm and the 
cooperative as separate profit centres but in optimizing the performance of the integrated 
farm/cooperative system (Staaz, 1987). Firstly, the scope for optimization is more diffuse 
because cooperative returns are distributed according to patronage, not investment. As a 
result, the cooperative does not have one locus for profit maximization but a separate locus 
for each member. Secondly, cooperatives tend to give greater weight to their patrons' fixed 
costs than companies. For example, an agricultural processing cooperative will more likely 
give greater emphasis to providing its supplier-members a market for their product than will a 
company because the cooperative takes into account of the need of its members to pay back 
their fixed on-farm production investments. Comparatively, a company usually does not have 
to deal directly with its suppliers' fixed costs, they are transformed via the market into the 
raw-product price that the company pays and considered as purely a variable cost (Staaz, 
1987). As a result, the capital of cooperatives tends to be less mobile than that of other 
business models as they concentrate their investments in agribusiness activities closely 
related to the farming activities of the members because the members might suffer substantial 
capital losses if their farming activities were not adequately supported. These capital losses 
would not affect the income of shareholders of a company serving these farmers. Hence, 
there would be little pressure on company management to invest in these agribusiness 
activities if more profitable opportunities lay elsewhere. 
 
5.6.2.6. Pricing behaviour 
The pricing behaviour of a cooperative directly affects the income of the members as opposed 
to companies whereby the income that shareholders derive from a company depend on the 
firm's profitability through dividends (Kyriakopoulos et al, 2004). As a result, cooperative 
members using their influence as owners demand to be involved in pricing decisions. But 
because of the diversity of member`s interests it may be difficult to reach a consensus about 
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what the appropriate pricing and cost-allocation rules should be. The result is that the price 
setting is likely to be a more costly process in cooperatives than in companies where 
management often makes pricing decisions with no shareholder input. Thus, a cooperative's 
ability to cut prices and offer subsidies in order to gain market share may be much more 
restricted than in companies. As a result, cooperatives may be less able than companies to 
enter new fields where gaining market share requires initial price-cutting.  However, contrary 
to the above arguments, Evan and Meade (2006) indicate that the pricing behaviour of 
cooperatives were the same as that of investor oriented firms. 
 
5.6.2.7 The structure of incentives facing individual stakeholders 
In order for both the cooperatives and company to be successful they have to coordinate their 
operations with those of the stakeholder‘s interests. Hind (1994) shows that the interest of the 
membership of a cooperative as a whole usually does not correspond with that of individual 
members. This is usually the case if incentives exist for cooperative members to operate their 
farms in a totally independent manner or when the cooperative has a highly heterogeneous 
membership which can make it difficult to get members to agree on anything other than 
running the cooperative as a separate profit centre. Such dilemmas‘ or problems of collective 
choice are rare in companies whose incentives to participate in the firm is to maximise 
shareholder value or profits.  
 
The differences in equity and how equity is treated by cooperative and company are different. 
The fact that equity capital does not appreciate in a cooperative may reduce the incentive to 
found a cooperative even when the social benefits of doing so exceed the social cost (Shaffer, 
1982). In the case that the cooperative is started and substantially improves the profitability 
of the founders' farm enterprises, there is the issue of free rider problem, horizon problem and 
portfolio problem to be dealt (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). On the contrary, entrepreneurs who 
found a successful company are rewarded with substantial capital gains as the net worth of 
the firm increases. Attracting new cooperative members may be difficult because of 
geographic limits on the cooperative's scope of operations and because, in certain 
cooperatives, only farmers engaged in particular types of production are admissible as 
members (Mooney and Gray, 2002). In comparison, geographic limitations do not apply to 
ownership and membership in a company.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
COMPARATIVE DYNAMISM OF COOPERATIVES AND COMPANIES 
 
6. 1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from the questionnaire survey investigating the dynamism of 
cooperatives and companies. Dynamism is compared based on four broad factors, which are 
(i) changes in adopting property rights, (ii) organisational strategies (iii) organisational 
culture and (iv) management. Of importance is that this chapter discusses recent trends and 
developments as well as the diversity in dynamism that both agribusinesses companies and 
cooperatives are adopting.   
 
6.2. Comparative dynamism of cooperatives and companies 
6.2.1. Organisational strategies 
Table 4 indicates that companies take corporate social investment more seriously, especially 
in as far as education is concerned. All the companies indicated that they played a direct role 
in corporate social investment by being involved in supporting schools and students through 
bursaries and donations. This is a clear form of social responsibility with a social dimension 
in a competitive context as explained by Porter and Kramer (2006), thus indicating the drive 
for agribusiness companies to engage in social responsibility if it will pay off for them in the 
future. Comparatively, cooperatives played an indirect role in corporate social responsibility 
through their subsidiaries. The difference is that cooperatives are more focused on generic 
social issues such as community development. Despite their limited role in education and 
training programmes cooperatives indicated that they are struggling to retain or recruit the 
right calibre of employees.  
 
Table 4: The role agribusinesses play in social responsibility 
Agribusiness Social responsibility 
Comp A Offers trainee programmes 
Comp B Sponsor student and donate to schools and child welfare institutions 
Comp C Focus on educational (Schools) and agriculture initiatives 
Comp D In the process of sponsoring a student 
Coop A Subsidiary supports a school for the blind 
Coop B Subsidiary supports community development 
Coop C None 
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Despite the importance of environmental sustainability or eco sensitive initiatives all the 
agribusinesses never adopted any environmental sustainability or eco sensitive initiatives 
except for two companies. Company A practised sustainable agricultural practises whereas 
company D adopted the initiatives in its fuel outlets because of mandated requirements from 
the EIA. The growing importance of social and environmental responsibility, has led to the 
adoption of triple bottom line accounting in order to account for firms` role in social and 
environmental responsibility (Savitz & Weber, 2006). Dynamic businesses firms use triple 
bottom line accounting when presenting their annual reports. Only one of the agribusinesses 
companies use triple bottom line accounting reporting comprehensively. The rest of the 
agribusinesses mainly report their financial and social responsibilities to a limited extent. 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is one of the most important and critical 
transformations occurring in South Africa. Even though businesses have until 2014 to 
become BEE compliant, the implications and impacts of BEE are already being felt 
especially in the allocation of certain contracts or tenders. BEE is measured in scorecard 
ratings, 40 points or less represents non BEE compliant, 41 to 65 points represents good 
contributors and a score of 66 plus represents excellent contributors (DTI, 2007). A business 
needs at least 40 points to be BEE compliant. Table 5 shows that only one of the agribusiness 
companies was BEE compliant, with a score of 50%, the rest scored less than 40%. This 
confirms concerns about the relatively slow pace of BEE compliance in agriculture and 
agribusinesses. The areas where agribusinesses have made significant advancements are in 
employment management and corporate social responsibility. However, to increase the BEE 
scores, agribusinesses need to work on business ownership, skills development, preferential 
procurement, enterprise development and employment equity. 
 
Table 5: The BEE scores 
Agribusiness BEE SCORE CARD 
Comp A Less than 40% 
Comp B Less than 40% 
Comp C 50% 
Comp D Less than 40% 
Coop A Less than 40% 
Coop B Less than 40% 
Coop C Less than 40% 
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All the agribusinesses interviewed acknowledged that competition in the industry were 
strong, necessitating the need for various investments and structural changes in order to be 
competitive. Horizontal integration appears to be the most widely adopted integration 
strategy by both companies and cooperatives as shown in Table 6. Only one company was 
involved in vertical integration and no agribusiness was involved in backward integration. 
This is mainly because of the advantages horizontal integration has on improving the 
competitive position of the company and reducing transaction costs on the same value chain 
whereas vertical integration serves more as a risk management strategy which can also be 
addressed by diversification as evident from the fact that agribusinesses that undertook 
horizontal integration also had diversified investments. Company A which did not diversify 
undertook vertical integration. The highly dynamic firms are more likely to have invested in 
the money market or outside agriculture, as was the case for company D, whereas, company 
C, company D and cooperative A made investments outside agriculture. Table 6 shows that 
all cooperatives and agribusiness companies have all taken part in mergers, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. Indicating a trend to building more networked organisations. These 
changes and investments have been motivated by management for both cooperatives and 
companies, contrary to the belief that members in cooperatives are the ones who push for 
such actions. However, it should be noted that management in a cooperative could hugely be 
made up of members. 
 
Table 6: Restructuring actions undertaken by the agribusinesses 
 Comp A Comp B Comp C Comp D Coop A Coop B Coop C 
Vertical integration          
Horizontal integration                
Diversification              
Invested in the money market          
Invested outside agriculture            
Mergers              
Joint ventures              
Strategic alliances             
Conversion to company          
acquisitions           
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All the agribusinesses in the study have undergone significant changes in their product mix or 
services and have added value to the products they handled before, mainly as a response to 
the changing consumer profile, tastes, to improve competitiveness and to gain markets. Table 
7 shows that two companies (B and D) have had significant changes to their clients whilst 
companies A and C haven‘t had changes to their customers over the past 5 years. Companies 
A and C converted from cooperatives to companies in 1998, whereas companies B and D 
converted recently, thus it is expected that the recent structural changes came with changes to 
customers and clients. Cooperatives still retain more or less the same customers or clients as 
they had five more years back. In addition, cooperatives distinguish between member and 
non members as clients by offering discounts to their members, thus offering an incentive to 
be a cooperative member, whereas companies do not distinguish between members and non 
members as clients. Both companies and cooperatives assisted their member clients to 
enhance their efficiency or profitability because it created value for the firm. 
 
Table 7: Changes in customers or clients 
 Comp A Comp B Comp C Comp D Coop A Coop B Coop C 
No change          
Slight changes           
Significant changes          
 
6.2.2 Organisational culture and structure 
Establishing the correct and appropriate organisation culture is an essential process of 
managing an organization (Schermerhorn et al, 2005). Figure 4 below shows how the 
different firms rated the following characteristics from a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 indicating that 
the specific characteristic does not exist whereas 5 indicates a strong presence of the 
characteristic. The results indicate that companies have a constructive culture which is much 
more dynamic than that of cooperatives. Team work and being a learning organisation is 
characteristic of companies, cooperatives also exhibits such characteristics though at a 
slightly lower scale. Even though diversity in employees is considered highly important by 
both cooperatives and companies, there is a consensus that recruitment is inhibited by the 
availability of suitable candidates and the negative view the job market has on agriculture, as 
well as the rural location of the agribusinesses.  
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Figure 4: Differences in organisational culture 
 
 
When the organisational culture of the agribusinesses are mapped using the approach 
developed by Schermerhorn et al (2005), cooperatives and companies show a hybrid of the 
constructive cultures and aggressive/ defensive cultures as shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: The organisational culture of the agribusinesses 
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All the agribusinesses have undergone some form of changes in their organisational structure 
in the past 5 years. This highlights the importance of adapting organisational structures to suit 
the environment. Figure 6 show that cooperatives have a hierarchal structure as compared to 
companies. Secondly, both cooperatives and agribusinesses are becoming more networked 
organisations. Cooperatives indicate that they have acquired a company or some business unit 
under their group name as compared to companies who state that they haven‘t done the same, 
with the exception of one company. However, analysis of company annual reports presents a 
different story because they indicate that companies do own one or more companies under 
their group name. Both cooperatives and companies seem to strongly agree that they have 
established independent companies or business units. These observations indicate that the 
organisational structures of agribusinesses is becoming more networked.  
 
Figure 6: The changes in organisational structure 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the old traditional organisational structure of most cooperatives. There has 
been a transition to a more networked organisational structure by cooperatives and companies 
as shown in Figure 8. Most units, subsidiaries and investments have been placed under one 
group name. Thus the question of who owns who and what is becoming relatively important 
for agribusinesses. Business empires are becoming the norm, with much emphasis becoming 
increasingly drawn to size and power. However, the changing organisational structures also 
confirm the nature and types of investments the agribusinesses have had to undertake in 
response to the dynamic business environment.  
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Networked organisation
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independent companies or units have been 
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Figure 7: Traditional organisation structure of cooperatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The organisation structure of modern cooperatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Management 
Table 8 shows that the management styles of both cooperatives and companies reflected a 
trend that is dynamic, informal, relaxed and focused on transforming people. In addition, all 
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the agribusinesses acknowledged to have changed their management styles to suit the new 
environment which is critical given the dynamic environment.  
 
Table 8: Management styles 
 Comp A Comp B Comp C Comp D Coop A Coop B Coop C 
Dynamic             
Informal and relaxed               
Formal        
Focused on transforming people          
Changed their management styles 
to suit the new environment  
              
Heterogeneous         
Homogeneous         
 
Management incentives and compensation has been shown to have a strong link with 
performance and thus organisational performance (Demsetz, 1983). As expected all the 
agribusiness companies offered benefits and incentives to management in order to enhance 
performance. Table 9 shows that the most common incentive to all the agribusinesses was the 
profit share and incentive bonus. However, one of the companies also offered honorary 
rewards or non financial recognition, a clear indication of a strong culture of high 
performance in the organisation. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the rate of staff turnover 
(management) is low for all the agribusinesses. 
 
Table 9: Management incentive schemes 
 Comp A Comp B Comp C Comp D Coop A Coop B Coop C 
share option            
profit sharing             
incentive bonus             
honorary rewards or non financial 
recognition 
        
 
6.2.4 Property rights 
Today‘s challenging environment requires organizations to have well defined and structured 
property rights in order to be successful. The cooperatives interviewed showed the same 
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property rights framework that has come under criticism and has led to the emergence of new 
cooperative models in other countries. The following summarise the property rights that 
emerge from the cooperatives; 
 No different classes of shares have been established to accommodate new 
investors 
 Shares are traded through private sells and do not fluctuate in value 
 Members still redeem their equity or shares at nominal value if they want to 
exit the organisation 
 Do not allow non patron investors in the organisation 
 There is still use of the one member one vote principle  
 
However, all the cooperatives indicated that the continued use of somewhat ill defined 
property rights was mainly because of the Cooperatives Act 2005 (Act 14 of 2005) that 
prohibits or limits the cooperatives to adopt well defined property rights as has been the case 
in other developed countries. The following were cited as the major constraints of the 
cooperatives Act 2005 (Act 14 of 2005); 
 Membership: the act restricts membership of cooperatives to natural persons only. 
Thus this provision is challenging or unclear especially for established cooperatives 
who are continually seeking membership from high net worth clients such as trust 
companies. 
 Voting principle: section 3(1) b and 14(1)(e) states that in the case of a primary co-
operative, each member has only one vote. Thus even if cooperatives were to adopt 
innovative voting systems, it would be against the act. In addition, the act strictly 
prohibits a weighted voting system based on shareholding or participation in the 
cooperative. Section 3(3) however indicates that the constitution of a secondary or 
tertiary co-operative may provide that the members have more than one vote: 
Provided that in the case of a secondary co-operative no member shall have more than 
fifteen per cent of the vote of all the members of the co-operative. Thus this is a 
constraint when compared to the company business model where share participation 
is unlimited (unless limited by the company articles). 
 Shares; section 41 (4) states that all shares issued must be of the same class and 
ranking thus making it difficult for cooperatives to create other innovative shares in 
order to cater for different investors needs. In addition, 41 (6) indicates that transfer of 
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membership shares is only valid if it complies with section 25, that gives a lot of 
power to the cooperative as they can defer such payment for a period not exceeding 
two years if the payment would adversely affect  the cooperatives financial well-
being. 
 
All the agribusinesses had the advantage of having enough capital to finance their major 
investments because they could acquire loans or credit easily due to their balance sheet. As 
expected, cooperatives still have members patronising the organisation as the majority of 
shareholders. The trend is similar in companies, the main investors are members or those 
involved with the organisation in one way or another, even though institutional investors like 
trust companies are stakeholders in companies, they are not the major shareholders. Figure 9 
shows that cooperatives seem to favour bank loans and reserved funds whereas companies 
seem to have a wider choice in sources for finance. All the cooperatives and companies had a 
conservative dividend policy in as far as declaring dividends were concerned whereas 
companies indicated in having an aggressive dividend policy in as far as investing is 
concerned. This indicates the relative importance of investments and the long term view 
companies have as compared to cooperatives whose long term view may be influenced by the 
horizon period of individual members.  
 
6.3 Motivations and reasons for structural changes 
The main reasons cooperatives state for undergoing structural changes is to raise capital, as a 
strategy to reduce costs and because of members leaving. Companies indicate that they have 
had to undergo structural changes (conversions included) mainly for political reasons, as a 
response to the deregulation of the industry, management pressure, seeking to expand the 
organization, response to the cooperatives act, relative merits of the company business model 
and seeking to improve competitiveness. The deregulation of the industry is cited as the 
major reason for structural changes by both cooperatives and companies, which shows the 
pressure competition exerts on businesses and the need to improve competitiveness in the 
dynamic environment. However, one inconsistent observation is that companies indicated 
that they have had to make structural changes in response to the cooperative act (act 14 of 
2005) even though they converted to companies in 1998 and were thus unaffected by the new 
act then. Figure 9 shows other reasons given for structural and their ratings on a scale of 0 to 
5. 
 
 82 
Figure 9: Reasons for structural changes 
 
 
6.4 Results of the dynamism score card 
Table 10 shows that companies are by far much more dynamic than cooperatives. The 
average dynamism score for companies is 83.75 as compared to the score of 62.33 for 
cooperatives. Cooperatives compare favourably well in all the dynamism factors except for 
their property rights framework, which is the main differential factor. Cooperatives are 
definitely not dynamic in terms of their property rights mainly because of the limitations of 
the Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005). All the agribusinesses still have to improve their role 
in environmental sustainability or eco sensitive initiatives, role in BEE as well as in adopting 
the triple bottom line accounting reporting method. Thus contrary to intuition and 
expectations, cooperatives are showing that they are as and have the potential to be more 
dynamic than companies if their property rights structures are addressed. More specifically if 
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the Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005) accommodates some issues that are constraining 
cooperative dynamism. 
 
Table 10: Results of the dynamism score card 
  COOPERATIVE  COMPANY 
Specific criteria of 
comparing dynamism 
Max 
Score 
A B C A B C D 
Role in corporate social 
investment 
3 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 
Environmental sustainability 
or eco sensitive initiatives 
3      3 3 
Nature of investments  5 5 4 3 5 4 4 5 
BEE score card 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
Accounting reporting method 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 
Changes in customers  4 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 
Changes in product mix or 
services and value addition 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Management style 10 10 8 9 9 9 10 8 
Management incentives and 
compensation 
15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Organisational culture 10 8 6 9 9 8 9 8 
Structure of the organisation 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Restructuring actions in the 
past 5 years? 
5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 
Type of investors 5 3 3 3 5 5 4 4 
Shares (price, how they are 
redeemed, classes) 
10 4 4 5 10 8 10 10 
Dividend policy 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 
Voting principle 5 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 
Capital structure 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 
DYNAMISM SCORE  68 61 68 85 80 88 82 
TOTAL DYNAMISM 
SCORE (Average) 
100 62.33 83.75 
 
6.5 Summary 
 Changes that are occurring in both cooperatives and companies confirm the increasing 
importance of dynamism in order to survive and lead in the ever changing business 
environment.  
 Contrary to prior expectations, cooperatives show that they are also embracing change 
because they have adopted new organisation strategies, structures and culture. 
Cooperative management also shows a great deal of dynamism that is closely 
comparable to companies.  
 However, the property rights of cooperatives are still the same with that of the much 
criticised traditional cooperatives. Thus their overall dynamism score is lower than 
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that of companies (62.33 as compared to 83.75). Cooperatives point at the difficulty to 
adhere to the Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005) and its limitations to changing the 
property rights of the cooperatives. Such limitations have meant that it is difficult or 
almost impossible for commercial cooperatives to adhere to such policy thus the 
choice to converting to companies. As a result, if amendments are not made to the 
cooperative act, there is expectation of a continual decrease in the number of 
commercial cooperatives, with the rise of development or emerging cooperatives 
which are heavily supported by the new cooperative act and other supporting policies?  
 On the contrary, companies seem to be more dynamic and embracing change even 
though they still have to improve their role in environmental sustainability or eco 
sensitive initiatives, role in BEE as well as in adopting the triple bottom line 
accounting reporting method in order to be fully dynamic, challenges also shared by 
cooperatives. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL PERFOMANCE OF COOPERATIVES AND 
COMPANIES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective in this chapter is to present the financial analysis of the agribusiness companies 
and cooperatives using financial ratios obtained or calculated from income statements and 
balance sheets as supplied by CIPRO. The relative performance of cooperatives to companies 
is compared across different financial ratios mainly, (i) profit margin, (ii) return on assets 
(R.O.A), (iii) return on equity (R.O.E), (iv) current ratio, (v) debt to asset ratio, (vi) asset 
turnover ratio, (vii) asset growth, (viii) revenue growth, and (ix) economic value added. 
However, it is important to note that because of the small sample size, there will be a 
tendency to underscore cooperative performance. On each financial ratio, the chapter first 
discusses the relative performance of agribusiness companies (A & B) that were formed by 
mergers by comparing them to their merger partners‘ in order to investigate the impact of 
such mergers. Of importance, an industry benchmark as set by Price Waterhouse and Coopers 
is also used to indicate on average how the firms are performing as compared to the industry 
as a whole.  
 
7.2 Financial accounting analysis 
7.2.1 Profit margin 
The profit margin measures how much out of every rand of sales a company actually keeps in 
earnings. Because profit margin illustrates the profit a company makes after paying off its 
costs, a higher profit margin indicates a more profitable company that has better control over 
its costs compared to its competitors. Gitman (2000) also indicates that profit margin 
illustrates how efficient the management is in using its labour and raw materials in the 
production process. Firms that have a high profit margin (over a period of at least 5 years) 
show that they can keep their costs under control, are more liquid and thus have more cash to 
spend on research and development expenses, marketing or investing. 
 
Figure 10 indicates that after the merger in 2004, Company A`s profit margin increased or 
was higher than that of the merging partners (data for the other merging partner was 
unavailable). On the contrary, Figure 11 shows that after the merger and its formation, 
Company B had a lower profit margin than one of the merging partners. Results in Figure 10 
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and Figure 11 suggest that one of the merger partners is likely to be more successful than the 
other merging partner. Thus, due to inadequate data, it is inconclusive as whether mergers 
resulted in an overall improved profit margin for the company.  
 
Figure 10: The profit margin of company A and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 11: The profit margin of company B and its merging partner 
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profit margin than cooperatives (albeit a small difference) for most years except from 2003 to 
2005 when cooperatives show a higher profit margin. Thus from the year 2000 to 2006 the 
differences in profit margins is relatively small, but is significantly higher in the years 1999, 
2006 and 2007. The PWC benchmarking survey indicates that the industry standard for profit 
margin is about 7.4% and 6.8% (2006 and 2007 respectively). Figure 12 shows that 
agribusiness companies under review managed to report a higher profit margin than the 
industry benchmark for 2007, whereas cooperatives have failed to surpass this industry 
benchmark for both 2006 and 2007. 
 
Figure 12: The profit margin of cooperatives and companies 
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Return on assets (R.O.A) indicates the profitability per rand of assets by measuring the firms` 
overall effectiveness in generating profits with its available assets. R.O.A gives an idea as to 
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better, because the company is earning more money on less investment. The lower the profit 
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Figure 13 indicates that company A`s ROA slightly increased and was higher than one of the 
merging partners (data for the other merging partner was unavailable). On the contrary, 
Figure 14 indicates that Company B reported lower ROA than one of the merging partners. 
Thus the data available was inconclusive as whether mergers resulted in an overall improved 
ROA but builds up a question or confirms the hypothesis that in most cases when mergers 
result from two or more firms, one of the mergers partners is more likely to be much more 
successful as compared to the other merging partner. 
 
Figure 13: Return on assets of company A and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 14: Return on assets of company B and its merging partner 
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The PWC benchmarking survey states that the standard R.O.A for agribusinesses is about 
10.91 (for the year 2006). Figure 15 shows that the agribusinesses under survey have a ROA 
below the industry average of 10.91 except for the years 1998, 1999 and 2007 when 
companies recorded a relatively higher ROA than the industry average. Figure 15 show that 
cooperatives reported a higher ROA than companies from the year 2000 to 2005. Companies 
had a higher ROA for the years 1999 and 2007. Thus contrary to expectations that companies 
will have a higher ROA due to their profit motive and the problem of under investment prone 
in cooperatives, evidence from the study shows that cooperatives perform relatively better in 
terms of ROA (although the difference is relatively small). However, the results show that 
while cooperatives had a higher ROA than companies from the years 2000 to 2005, they have 
been losing this advantage after the year 2005 whereas companies are gaining advantage and 
reporting increasing and higher ROA. 
 
Figure 15: Return on assets of cooperatives and companies 
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financially sound enough to withstand troubled times, improving ROE could be just a 
temporary illusion or an indication of serious trouble (Gitman, 2000). 
 
Evidence from the study shows that when comparing ROE of merged companies, consistent 
observations as those shown in profit margin and ROA stand. Figure 16 indicates that after 
the merger and formation of Company A, Company A`s ROE slightly increased or was 
higher than one of the merging partners (data for the other merging partner was unavailable). 
Comparatively, Figure 17 indicates that after the merger, Company B had a lower ROE than 
one of the merging partners. However, the ROE of company B is increasing yearly.  
 
Figure 16: Return on equity of company A and its merging partner 
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Figure 17: Return on equity of company B and its merging partner 
 
 
The comparative performance of cooperatives and companies as measured by ROE shows 
fluctuations. Figure 18 indicates that cooperatives show dominance in performance in the 
years 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005, whereas companies show a better performance in the 
years 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2007. Results on ROE also confirm that cooperatives are 
beginning to lose their performance advantage whereas companies show relatively higher 
performance gains than cooperatives from the year 2005 to 2007. 
 
Figure 18: Return on equity of cooperatives and companies 
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7.2.4. Current ratio 
The current ratio measures the firm‘s ability to meet its short term obligations by comparing 
current assets to current liabilities. A ratio less than one suggests that the 
company would be unable to pay off its obligations if they came due at that point. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that it will go bankrupt as there are many ways to access 
financing, but it is definitely not a good sign. A current ratio ranging from 1.5 to 2 is 
generally considered acceptable and shows that the firm has good short-term financial 
strength. Gitman (2000) states that when the current ratio is very high, for example more than 
three, it is not desirable because it means that management has so much cash on hand that 
could be used for better purposes such as (i) expanding business operations, (ii) investing in 
short term securities and earning interest. 
 
Figure 19 indicates that company A`s current ratio has remained fairly stable between one 
and 1.5 with only small annual increases. When compared to one of its merger partner, 
company A shows that its merger partner initially had a higher current ratio but mainly in the 
acceptable range of between one and two which has been fairly stable over the years. On the 
contrary, Figure 20 indicates that after the merger, company B reported a decreasing trend in 
its current ratio, from about 2.5 in 2005 to slightly above one in 2007. The current ratio of 
company B`s merger partner fluctuates between 2 and 3 from the years 1997 to 2003, with a 
significantly higher and undesirable ratio of above 5 in 2004. What can be drawn from the 
analysis is that after their mergers, both companies have a kept their current ratio lower, in 
the range of between 1 and 1.5 in the last two years (2006 and 2007).  
 
Figure 19: Current ratio of company A and its merging partner 
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Figure 20: Current ratio of company B and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 21 shows that the current ratio of cooperatives has remained relatively stable (between 
one and two) from 1999 to 2007. On the other hand, companies have maintained a relatively 
higher current ratio (between 1.5 and 2.5) over the same period. 
 
Figure 21: Current ratio of cooperatives and companies 
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its debt payments or alternatively can also point to a rapidly expanding firm that is using debt 
successfully to expand its business. If the company can produce returns on borrowed capital 
that exceed the cost of those funds, it can continue to successfully expand its debt/asset ratio. 
A debt to asset ratio of less than 50 percent is considered acceptable (Gitman, 2000).   
 
Figure 22 shows that company A increased its debt to asset ratio to 100% after the merger, 
and has been consistent for the years 2005 to 2007. Comparatively, company A`s merging 
partner had a very low debt to asset ratio (less than 50%) in 1998 and 1999, and around 60% 
for the years 2000 to 2004. Figure 23 show that company B also increased its debt to asset 
ratio after the merger, from a low of 14% to about 34%. Company B has a significantly lower 
ratio than Company A. Conclusively, companies formed by the mergers indicate the trend to 
increasing debt to asset ratio after the mergers, possibly because of their increased credit 
worth (thus they can easily take up more debt) and/or their need for further investments after 
the mergers. 
 
Figure 22: Debt to asset ratios of company A and its merging partner 
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Figure 23: Debt to asset of company B and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 24 shows that all the agribusinesses had a debt to asset ratio of less than 100%. Figure 
25 shows that the debt to asset ratio of companies fluctuates around 40 to 80% and is usually 
above that of cooperatives except for the years 2003, 2004 and 2007. Cooperatives on the 
other hand have maintained their debt to asset ratio at between 55 to 65% from the year 2001 
to 2007, with the exception of the years 1999 and 2000 were a ratio of 30% and 13% was 
reported respectively. Conclusively, cooperatives consistently maintained significantly lower 
debt to asset ratios than companies. This could be attributable to the debt financing power of 
companies as compared to cooperatives.  
 
Figure 24: Debt to asset of cooperatives and companies 
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7.2.6 Asset turnover ratio 
Asset turnover is an efficiency ratio that shows the sales or revenue produced for every rand 
of assets owned. Asset turnover ratio reflects how efficiently business assets generate 
revenues, thus a high asset turnover ratio means that the business is using its assets more 
efficiently. Gitman (2000) states that an asset turnover ratio is also used to analyze if the 
business` growth in assets base is keeping pace with its sales. The higher the asset turnover 
ratio then the more desirable it is for the business. 
 
Figure 25 shows that before the year company A was formed, its merging partner recorded its 
lowest asset turnover ratio of 59% even though from the period 1998 to 2003, it recorded 
ratios of at least 110%, with an impressive 1181% in 1998 (probably because the company 
was starting and had not made significant asset investments). However, after the merger, 
company A`s asset turnover has remained fairly stable at a low (relative to the merging 
partner) of about 69 to 89%. Figure 26 showing company B also confirms the same trend, 
after the merger, company B shows a decreasing asset turnover ratio from 60% to 54% from 
2005 to 2007 respectively. On the contrary, company B`s merging partner had an asset 
turnover ratio ranging from 60 to 100% between 1998 to 2004. Thus the data available 
indicates that the asset turnover ratios of the companies decreased when the mergers took 
place.  
 
Figure 25: Asset turnover ratio of company A and its merging partner 
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Figure 26: Asset turnover ratio of company B and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 27 shows that throughout the whole time period under review, cooperatives had a 
stable and significantly lower asset turnover ratio than companies (ranging from 88% to 
141%). Comparatively, companies show very wide fluctuations in asset turnover ratio from 
the year 1997 to 2004, and then from 2005 to 2007 the ratio is fairly stable (141% to 160%). 
Even though cooperatives have been improving their asset turnover from the year 2000 to 
2004, they start to show a decreasing trend from the year 2005 to 2007 whereas companies 
are reporting increasing trends in the past two years. Thus once again, cooperatives are 
decreasing in performance (becoming more inefficient). 
 
Figure 27: Asset turnover ratio of cooperatives and companies 
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7.2.7. Asset growth 
Business firms need to invest in assets in order to be competitive. Such asset investments 
include investing in productive processing facilities or processes that improve the efficiency 
of their operations. Of importance is that asset growth should result in improved revenues, 
profitability and efficiency. A sustainable and positive asset growth is usually desirable for 
any business. Figure 28 shows that company A`s assets increased and are higher than its 
merging partner. The same observation applies for company B as shown in Figure 29. Thus 
the results seem to suggest that assets grew after the mergers and have been increasing which 
is expected because of the combined asset value of the merging firms and the drive to 
continuously invest in assets to improve competitiveness. 
 
Figure 28: Total assets of company A and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 29: Total assets of company B and its merging partner 
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Figure 30 shows that both companies and cooperatives have been reporting stable increases 
in assets from the year 1999 to 2007. Companies show a superior advantage over 
cooperatives throughout the whole period as they reported higher asset growth especially 
from 2003 to 2007. Asset growth in both companies is mainly attributed to acquisitions, 
mergers, horizontal integration, vertical integration as indicated in Table 6. Of major note, is 
that cooperatives invest in both non-cooperative and cooperative ventures thus they have also 
experienced asset growth comparable to companies.  
 
Figure 30: Total assets of cooperative and companies 
 
 
7.2.8 Revenue growth 
Revenue growth shows how firms have been able to expand their businesses, more 
specifically sales. Gitman (2000) states that good revenue growth improves profits, is 
sustainable over time, does not use unacceptable levels of capital and is also primarily 
internally generated. Revenue growth reflects the growth of the business more specifically 
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Figure 31 shows that company A managed to increase its revenue growth after the merger as 
it reported higher gross revenues than its merging partner. Percentage growth in revenue as 
shown in Figure 32 also confirms this observation by showing that the merging partner 
reported a negative revenue growth the year before the merger. After the merger, company A 
increased revenues by 16% and 20%. Figure 33 and Figure 34 indicate that company B also 
shows the same trend noted in company A. After the merger, company B reported higher 
increases in gross revenues. Thus the data available indicates that the revenues of the 
companies increased when the mergers took place.  
 
Figure 31: Revenue growth of company A and its merging partner  
 
 
Figure 32: Percentage growth in revenue of company A and its merging partner 
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Figure 33: Revenue growth of company B and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 34: Percentage growth in revenue of company B and its merging partner 
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positive note though cooperatives show stable increases throughout the period under review. 
Interestingly, both cooperatives and companies show revenue or profit from sales of assets 
after a year or two of acquiring other firms. This prompts or suggests evidence of asset 
stripping
3
. After a year or two from the purchase or acquisition of other businesses the 
agribusinesses have recorded income from the sale of assets thus indicating that there is 
prevalence of the purchase of companies in order to strip their assets and make a profit.  
 
Figure 35: Revenue growth of cooperatives and companies 
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or more businesses combining to form one firm, one of the mergers partners is more likely to 
be much more successful and doing well as compared to the other merging partner.  
 
Figure 36: Economic value added of company A and its merging partner 
 
 
Figure 37: Economic value added of company B and its merging partner 
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When comparing averages, both cooperatives and companies destroyed value for their 
shareholders. However, Figure 38 shows that companies are improving significantly as they 
show a movement towards a positive EVA. Cooperatives are continually destroying 
shareholders value as their EVA seems to be getting worse and more negative. 
 
Figure 38: Economic value added of cooperatives and companies 
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 Results confirm that companies had a relatively higher profit margin than 
cooperatives for most years except from 2003 to 2005 (albeit a small difference).  
 Cooperatives show that they have a higher ROA than companies from the year 2000 
to 2006. Companies had a higher ROA for the years 1999 and 2007. Thus contrary to 
expectations that companies will have a higher ROA due to their profit motive and the 
problem of under investment in cooperatives. Evidence from the study shows that 
cooperatives perform relatively better in terns of ROA (although the differences is 
relatively small). However, the results show that while cooperatives initially had 
higher ROA than companies, they have been losing this advantage from the year 
2005. 
 There are fluctuations in as far as ROE between cooperatives and companies. 
Cooperatives show dominance in performance from the years 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004 
and 2005, whereas companies show a dominance or better performance in the years 
1999, 2002 and from 2005 to 2007. Results on ROE also confirm that cooperatives 
are beginning to decline in performance whereas companies show relatively higher 
performance gains from 2005 to 2007. 
 The current ration of companies has been higher than that of companies throughout 
the time period.  
 The debt to asset ratio of companies fluctuates around 40 to 80%, and is usually above 
that of cooperatives except for the years 2003, 2004 and 2007.  
 Cooperatives had significantly lower asset turnover ratio than companies. Even 
though cooperatives have been improving their asset turnover from the year 200 to 
2004, they start to show a decreasing trend from the year 2005 to 2007. Whereas 
companies have shown slight fluctuations and reported increasing trends in the past 
two years.  
 Companies and cooperatives have been reporting stable increases in assets from the 
year 1999 to 2007. Companies show a superior advantage over cooperatives as they 
reported higher assets and higher growth especially from 2003 to 2007.  
 Cooperatives and companies reported increasing revenues. Companies show wide 
fluctuations in revenue growth but maintain significantly higher revenues than 
cooperatives from the year 1997 to 2007. On a positive note though is that 
cooperatives show stable increases throughout the period under review.  
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 Both cooperatives and companies destroyed value for their shareholders. However, 
companies are improving significantly as they show a movement towards a positive 
EVA. Cooperatives are continually destroying shareholders value and their EVA 
seems to be getting more negative. 
 Overall, companies had the strongest relative performance in most of the financial 
ratios mainly profit margin, ROE, current ratio, debt to asset ratio, asset turnover 
ratio, asset growth, revenue growth and EVA, and their relative performance was 
improving.  
 Cooperatives only show a clear advantage on ROA and sometimes ROE. 
 Conclusively, the performance of cooperatives is only slightly lower, with no big 
significant difference from companies. However, the concern is that in the past two 
years, cooperatives seem to be reporting decreasing performance thus significantly 
losing their advantage in most of the financial ratios. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Summary of the results 
This study provided a holistic analysis of the implications of converting from a cooperative to 
a company by analysing the comparative performance of cooperatives and companies. The 
summary of the research questions and findings as are briefly stated below. 
 
i. How has the conversion to companies affected performance? Do cooperatives that have 
adopted the company business model perform better than cooperatives that never 
converted?  
Companies had the strongest relative performance in most of the financial ratios mainly 
profit margin, ROE, current ratio, debt to asset ratio, asset turnover ratio, asset growth, 
revenue growth and EVA. Cooperatives only show a clear advantage on ROA and in 
some years ROE. Even though, the differences in performance are slightly higher in 
favour of companies, in the past two years, cooperatives seem to be reporting decreasing 
performance thus losing their advantage in most of the financial ratios analysed. Based 
on the financial performance results, operating as a company or converting from a 
cooperative to a company could result in slight increases in financial performance. 
 
ii. Why have cooperatives converted? What are some of the external or internal reasons 
and motives that prompted conversion? 
The main reasons companies indicated for undergoing structural changes and 
conversions are, (i) as a response to the deregulation of the industry, (ii) political 
reasons, (iii) management pressure, (iv) seeking to expand the organization, (v) response 
to the cooperatives act, (vi) relative merits of the company business model and (vii) 
seeking to improve the competitiveness of the organization. Response to the 
deregulation of the industry is cited as the major reason for converting, which is 
consistent with the observation that most conversions occurred in 1998 after the 
deregulation of markets and withdrawal of state support. 
 
iii. Are cooperatives necessarily a less efficient organisational structure than the company 
business model? 
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Companies show that they are much more efficient than companies. In addition, in the 
past two years, cooperatives have been becoming even much more inefficient whereas 
companies improved their efficiency in the past two years.  
 
iv. Which challenges and opportunities were encountered during the process? 
Because cooperatives are a different organisation from companies the first major 
problem encountered during the conversion process was cited as the conflict of interests 
between management and members. Most such conversions seem to have been initiated 
by management. Although alternative organisational changes exists e.g. mergers, 
acquisitions or takeovers, integration, joint venture, that can improve the 
competitiveness of cooperatives, they do not fully address the property rights challenges 
that cooperatives face. Thus conversions are the preferred solution to address the ill-
defined property rights structure of cooperative.  
 
v. What are the implications of such a change to members in as far as services obtained, 
shares, control, dividends and member‘s wealth is concerned?  
When the cooperatives converted to companies, members were given an option to be  
shareholders in the new companies and thus much of the control came as voting rights 
based on their shareholding which varied depending on members individual`s wealth in 
purchasing additional shares. Cooperatives distinguish between members and non 
members as clients by offering discounts to their members, thus offering an incentive to 
be a cooperative member, whereas companies do not distinguish between members and 
non members as clients. Of major note is that both companies and cooperatives assisted 
their member clients to enhance efficiency or profitability because it created value for 
the firm. Converting to companies thus results in the loss of incentives offered by 
cooperatives to its members, such a loss should be weighed against the gains from stock 
returns in a company.  
 
vi. How does the management reconcile the economic self interest of members versus the 
investors, or the developmental imperative versus the economic viability of the 
organisation?  
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A consistent observation in all the companies was that once cooperative members have 
been admitted as shareholders in the company, the primary objective of the 
organisation is changed to that of furthering all members interest as investors, thus 
return on investments, dividends and profitability become of primary interest other 
than furthering members interest as input suppliers or clients through incentives such 
as discounts e.t.c. However, both companies and cooperatives assisted their member 
clients to enhance their efficiency or profitability because it created value for the firm. 
Thus there appears to be a balance by management to further the interest of members 
as investors and members as clients even though investors (shareholders) are the 
ultimate primary focus of companies. As such the economic viability of converted 
cooperatives seems to be of more importance than its development imperative which is 
only furthered to a limited extent through corporate social responsibility.  
 
vii. What are the implications of such a change to investors in as far as shares, dividends 
and return to investments is concerned?  
Both cooperatives and companies destroyed value for their shareholders. However, 
companies are improving significantly as they show a movement towards a positive 
EVA. Cooperatives are continually destroying shareholders value as their EVA seems to 
be getting more negative. 
 
viii. How has the organisation adapted to the needs of an advancing industrial society? 
Results show that even though companies are more dynamic than cooperatives, 
cooperatives compare relatively well in all aspects except for their property rights which 
is mainly a direct result of the Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005) which affects 
cooperatives not companies. Thus cooperatives can be as dynamic as companies or even 
better if the Act is revised and consideration is made for commercial cooperatives. 
ix. How do converted cooperatives differ to those that never converted in as far as 
organisation culture, management culture, style, competence and incentives? 
Contrary to prior expectations, cooperatives show that they are also embracing change 
because they have adopted new organisation strategies, structures and culture similar to 
that of companies. Cooperative management also shows a great deal of dynamism that 
is closely comparable to companies. Cooperatives scored a dynamism score of 62.33 
compared to 83.75 for companies. 
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8.2 Conclusion of the study 
The study indicates that cooperatives compare relatively well to companies although there 
have potential to do even much better if their property rights structure is addressed. The main 
shortcomings of cooperative property rights were that of not allowing external investors into 
the cooperatives and the one member one vote principle for primary cooperatives or the 15% 
cap for secondary cooperatives. Cooperatives point at the difficulty to adhere to the 
Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005) and its limitations to adopting modern cooperative trends. 
Such limitations have left commercial cooperatives with the choice of converting to 
companies as the ultimate solution to address their property rights structure. As a result, if 
amendments are not made to the cooperative act, there is an expectation of a continual 
decrease in the number of commercial cooperatives, with the rise of development or 
emerging cooperatives which are heavily supported by the new cooperative act and other 
supporting policies.  
 
Because cooperatives compare relatively well to companies then there is evidence to suggest 
that there is need to curb such conversions for various reasons. Firstly, it is widely 
acknowledged that in order for primary agriculture and farmers to increase their wealth and 
competitiveness they have to at least own a part of the supply chain. Even though both 
cooperative and companies offer such an opportunity, cooperatives are more member 
oriented and thus would serve primary agriculture and farmers better than companies that are 
investor oriented. Companies are expected to appeal because they offer a better investment 
return than cooperatives, but as shown in the study if cooperatives can compare relatively 
well in terms of financial performance, then members seeking to further their interest other 
than a higher return in investment could opt for a cooperative than a company.  
 
8.3 Recommendations and areas for further study 
Lessons on cooperative policy and structures can be drawn from other countries mainly the 
USA and New Zealand. Lobbying for the change of the Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005) in 
order to accommodate commercial cooperatives seems farfetched given the length of time it 
took for the Act to be drawn up and passed in parliament. In addition, such a task becomes 
more challenging because the Act appears to be in line with the political and economic 
pressure to address the problem of inequity. Thus, given a debate on commercial versus 
developing cooperatives at this stage in South Africa, developing cooperatives will always 
win. Therefore, not many changes are bound to be made to the Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 
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2005). Alternative options exist, commercial cooperatives or policy makers can push to 
follow the case of New Zealand where a new type of organisation called the cooperative 
company has been introduced. Such an organisation in South Africa can thus be introduced 
and governed by the Companies Act instead of the cooperative Act which is more 
development oriented. This would make cooperatives much more dynamic and be able to 
address some of the constraints and challenges they face in meeting the requirements of the 
Cooperatives Act (Act 14 of 2005). 
 
There are various research areas that need to be done in South Africa on cooperatives. Much 
of the research is not published and is mainly done for private purposes such as consultancy 
work. As such, it is difficult to give trace on what has been done and hasn‘t been done with 
regard to cooperative research based on publications from the main journals. However, the 
following issues are recommended for further research.  
 The weakness of case studies is that they cannot be generalised and used to provide a 
conclusion for the whole country. Thus, more case studies need to be carried out to 
validate and compare the findings of this study. 
 Given enough data, specific studies on the implications of mergers and other 
structural changes such as integration, acquisitions need to be done. 
 There are several comparative factors between cooperatives and companies that need 
to be investigated. For example, investment in infrastructure such as office buildings, 
processing facilities, the psychological behaviour and state of their employees e.t.c. 
Some of these factors are beyond the discipline of agriculture economics but do have 
an impact on the relative performance of firms. 
 Finally, there is need to investigate the history of cooperative policy in South Africa, 
by asking questions such as why, by whom and how cooperative policy is made. 
Answers to these questions would be important in showing the influences, impacts 
and future direction of cooperatives and cooperative policy in South Africa. 
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Appendice 1: Questionnaire 
Questionnaire concerning the comparative performance of cooperatives that converted 
to companies and cooperatives that never converted 
 
Respondent and Organisations` Information 
Name of Organisation  
Sector  
Position of respondent  
Contact Phone No.  
Location of interview  
Date of interview  
 
Hello, I am Wellington Sikuka from Stellenbosch University in the Western Cape. We are 
talking to a cross-section of agribusiness companies and cooperatives in the Western Cape 
about the issues and implications of converting from a cooperative to a company. Your views 
will be used to help inform on the much needed insight on cooperative conversions and assist 
policy makers to make informed decisions on cooperatives or agribusinesses. 
 
This interview is completely confidential. Your name will never be associated with your 
answers. 
 
I hereby certify that this is an honest interview taken in accordance with my academic needs 
only. For further information or enquiries you can contact my supervisor Dr A.M.S Karaan. 
 
…………………………………  ……………………….. 
Interviewer‘s Signature  Date  
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SECTION A: ORGANISATIONAL INFORMATION AND CULTURE 
Mark with an X or  (tick) were appropriate! 
 
1. How do you consider your competition in the industry? 
Light    Strong    Manageable   
 
2. (a) Does your organisation undertake any corporate social investment? 
 Yes     No  
 
    (b) If Yes, please specify what type of investments? 
......................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. (a) Has your organisation undertaken some environmental sustainability or eco sensitive 
initiatives?  
 Yes     No  
 
    (b) If Yes, please specify what type of initiatives? 
......................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding 
your organisation? 
Strongly disagree 1 
Disagree  2 
Neutral  3 
Agree   4 
Strongly Agree 5 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The leadership style has changed to suit the new environment      
The company can be described as a learning organization      
Team work is an essential structure for the organisations` 
success 
     
Organisational culture plays an important role in the success 
of the organisation 
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5. When recruiting new employees, to what extent do you consider diversity? 
No extent   
Small extent  
To some extent  
To a large extent  
To a very large extent  
 
SECTION B: ORGANISATION RESTRUCTURING AND DYNAMISM 
Mark with an X or  (tick) were appropriate 
 
6. Please indicate the nature of investments your business has undertaken in the past 5 years  
Vertical integration  
Horizontal integration  
Diversification  
Money market  
Outside agriculture  
Other (Please state)  
 
7. Has your organisation undergone any of the following restructuring actions in the past 5 
years? 
Mergers   
Acquisition   
Joint venture  
Conversion to a company  
Strategic alliances  
 
8. Who motivated such actions? 
Members  
Management  
External parties  
Other (please specify)  
 
 
 134 
9. Rate the following on a scale of 1 to 5 on the decision to convert or restructure? With 1 
indicating no role and 5 indicating main role on the decision to convert or restructure. 
 
(a) Members leaving the organisation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(b) To raise capital? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(c) Improve competitiveness of the organisation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(d) Relative merits of the company business model? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(e) Discontent with the performance of the organisation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(f) As a strategy to reduce costs? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(g) Response to the Cooperative Act (Act 14 of 2005)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(h) Discontent with the structure of the cooperative? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(i) Seeking to expand your business empire? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(j) Members pressure? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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(k) Management pressure? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(l) Response to the deregulation of the industry? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(m) Changes in tax laws (1997)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(n) Political reasons? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. What happened to the number of members of the cooperative after the conversion? 
Static   Decrease  Increased 
 
11. (a) What is your BEE score card? 
Less that 40%   40.1 to 64.9%   Greater than 65 
 
    (b) Which area does your organisation need to work on inorder to improve your score 
card? 
Business Ownership  
Employment Equity  
Employment Management  
Skills Development  
Preferential Procurement  
Enterprise Development  
Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
12. Do you apply triple bottom line accounting reporting on your annual reports? 
Yes    No 
 
NB: Triple bottom line accounting is reporting financial information, social information as 
well as environmental information regarding the business. 
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13. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding 
your organisational structure? 
Strongly disagree 1 
Disagree  2 
Neutral  3 
Agree   4 
Strongly Agree 5 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Organisation structure has not changed for the past 5 years       
The organisation structure is hierarchal      
The organisation is now more networked      
Various other companies or units have been put under one 
group name 
     
The organisation has established independent companies or 
units 
     
 
SECTION C: PERFOMANCE INFORMATION 
Mark with an X or  (tick) were appropriate 
 
14. How do you finance your major investments? 
Bank loans  
Reserved funds  
Issue shares  
New members  
Capital seeking entities (e.g. strategic 
alliance, a trust company or a publicly held 
subsidiary) 
 
Other  
 
15. How do you rate your staff turnover (specifically management)? 
Low   Moderate  High   Very High 
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16. How has the product mix or services you offer changed in the past 5 years? 
Still the same  
Slight changes  
Moderate changes  
Significant changes  
 
17. Have you made any value addition to the products you handled before? 
Yes     No 
 
18. (a) Do you have any performance benchmark for the organisation?  
 Yes    No 
 
      (b) If Yes, who are you benchmarking yourself against? 
Leading global businesses  
Other cooperatives  
Local agribusinesses  
Internally generated benchmark  
Other  
 
19. Do you have enough capital to finance your major investments? 
Yes    No   
 
20. Which investors provide the majority of equity for the organisation (rank from the highest 
to lowest and estimate percentage shareholding)? 
 Rank (1 to 3) Percentage 
Members patronising the organisation   
Shareholders   
External investors (including trust companies)   
 
21. Have your major customers changed over time?  
 No changes  Slight changes   significant changes 
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22. (a) Do you distinguish between member and non members as clients? 
Yes    No 
 
       (b) If Yes, Please state How? 
......................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................... 
 
23. (a) Does your organisation do any special efforts to enhance the efficiency or profitability 
of its member clients? 
 Yes    No 
 
      (b) Did it create value for the firm? 
 Yes    No 
 
SECTION D: OWNERSHIP INFORMATION 
Mark with an X or  (tick) were appropriate! (If company head straight to question 26, 28 & 
31) 
 
24. Which criteria are used to allow new members to join the organisation? 
Based on potential patronage that they will bring to the organisation  
Membership is closed   
Restricted to members with the same interest  
Open to anyone with the money to buy shares (public)  
Contribute nominal membership fee  
By invitation  
Other  
 
25. Have you created different classes of shares to accommodate new investors? 
Yes    No   
 
26. (a) How are your shares traded? 
 Private sells   Publicly offers  Stock exchange 
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      (b). Does the share price fluctuate in value? 
 Yes    No     
 
27. How do members redeem their equity or shares if they want to exit the organisation? 
Get paid their nominal value  
Get paid the market value  
Other (please specify)  
 
28. How would you describe your dividend policy? 
Conservative   Aggressive 
 
29. Do you allow non patron investors in the organisation? 
Yes     No 
 
30. What voting principle do you use? 
One member one vote  
Based on patronage  
Based on shareholding  
Other  
 
31. How well attended are shareholder meetings? 
      Poorly                         Average   Well Attended 
 
32. Do you feel that members are sufficiently informed about the organisation in the 
following areas? 
 YES NO 
Major policy decisions   
Operations   
Marketing strategy   
Financial status   
Governance   
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SECTION E: MANAGEMENT CULTURE, STYLE, COMPTENCE AND 
INCENTIVES 
Mark with an X or  (tick) were appropriate 
 
33. How best can you describe the management team of your organisation?  
Heterogeneous  
Homogeneous  
Autocratic  
Bureaucratic  
Dynamic  
Formal   
Informal relaxed style.  
Focus on transforming people  
 
34. Do you offer benefit programmes to management in order to enhance performance? 
 Yes    No 
 
35. What type of incentives do you use to reward management performance? 
Share option  
Profit share   
Incentive bonus  
Honorary rewards or non financial recognition  
Other (please state)  
 
SECTION F: POLICIES OR LEGISLATION 
Mark with an X or  (tick) were appropriate 
 
36. Are you happy with the recent Cooperative Act (Act 14 of 2005)? 
 Yes    No 
 
37. (a) Have you made any response to the Cooperative Act (Act 14 of 2005)? 
 Yes    No 
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       (b) If Yes, please state what? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
 
 
